On Incentive Equlibria for Dynamic Games

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非对称异性人口的HIV/AIDS流行病模型的平衡点的存在性和稳定性

主要讨论非对称异性人口的 HIV/AIDS流行病模型的平衡点的存在性 ,并给出其稳定的条件.     

多重均衡与社会选择

将社会看作一个N人博弈,以微分动态系统和微分几何为基础研究了多重博弈均衡选择问题,研究结果表明强加的或者独裁的均衡选择模式意味着在均衡选择中存在着一个强加的或者独裁的度量系统.此后,对度量系统引发的效率损失和度量系统对博弈局中人的策略选择进行了讨论.     

基于博弈学习理论的企业组织模式演化动态

应用博弈学习理论研究企业组织模式的演化动态.假定企业具有有限理性以及近视眼行为,企业选择某一组织模式的概率依赖于其自身偏好及该组织模式对应的市场份额,考虑到企业的进入行为,建立了单种群演化动态及适应性学习算法,分析了利润函数的性质对演化均衡的显著影响.在此基础上,以企业群体内部和企业群体之间的溢出效应为出发点,建立了两种群演化动态并研究了演化均衡和吸引域的变化.理论分析和数值模拟充分表明,从长期来看,企业组织模式的演化均衡结果取决于溢出效应的大小.     

军事威慑中试探策略博弈分析

在标准两阶段军事威慑博弈基础上构建了带有挑战者试探策略和含有信号传递子博弈的三阶段威慑博弈模型，分析了该博弈的混同均衡和分离均衡，提出了军事威慑博弈中试探策略有效运用的基本条件。     

Coalitional Equilibria in Coalitional Abstract Economies with Nonordered Preferences

This paper investigates the existence of coalitional equilibria for coalitional abstract economies with nonordered preferences. Accordingly, the authors give a fuzzy extension of the coalitional equilibrium existence theorem. The main result is illustrated with applications to coalitional abstract economies with payoff functions, strong Nash equilibria and absolute optimal solutions.     

The Interaction Programming Problem

1　 IntroductionMany economic systems involve two or multiple planners with differentdecision variablesand different objective functions.In some of these problems,any planners′choice of hisdecision variables may affect the other′s choice of their decision variables.Each planner,in an attempt to optimize his objective function,chooses values for the variables that hecontrols when the other planners′decision variables were given.There are no hierarchyamong all the planners.The values of any …     

THE STRICT POSITIVITY IN A NONSTANDARD HULL AND ITS APPLICATIONS TO ECONOMICS

1.IntroductionThenonstandardhull,originallyintroducedbyLuxemburgin[1],hasprovedtobeausefultoolinstudyingthelocaltheoryofBanachspacesandnormedRieszspaces.Asystematictheoryinthisaspectisdevelopedin[2--4].However,peoplepaylessattentiontostrictlypositivevecto…     

一类比率依赖种群模型在常数收获下的分岔

利用微分方程定性理论以及规范型理论研究了一类具有常数收获项的生物模型.首先,考虑常数收获项对该模型非负平衡点的影响,讨论平衡点的稳定性情况.其次,选取常数收获项作为参数,给出系统存在鞍结点分岔、Hopf分岔以及极限环的充分条件.进一步地,考虑双参数分岔,给出系统存在余维2的Bogdanov-Takens分岔的充分条件.结果表明,由于添加了常数收获项,系统具有丰富的动力学行为.最后,通过数值仿真验证了所得结果的正确性.     

ULTIMATE STABILITY OF A TYPE OF CHARACTERISTIC EQUATION WITH DELAY DEPENDENT PARAMETERS

Delay differential systems are widely used in many different fields, It is important to determine the local stability of their equilibria, For systems with＇ delay dependent parameters, the stability analysis of equilibria is complicated and difficult In this paper, we shall investigate the ultimate stability of a type of characteristic equation with delay dependent parameters. Our results show that the characteristic equation with delay dependent parameters may be one of ultimately stable, ultimately unstable, and alternate between stable and unstable. Applying our results, the ultimate stability can be often decided directly and need not appeal to mathematic software. Two examples are given in this paper,     

Multiple Criteria Games-Theory and Applications

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n人0-1理性博弈的严格纯Nash均衡和期望均衡求解法与期望均衡分析

为了解决每个参与人恰有两个行动且极大熵准则以及每个参与人都完全不知道其他参与人的行动信息是全体参与人的共同知识的多人策略博弈的可能出现局势,给出了严格纯Nash均衡和期望均衡的求解法和最可能局势的分析法及其用应例子。以二进制和十进制数为基本工具,证明了严格纯Nash均衡的一个求解算法,基于全体参与人上述共同知识系统,给出了一个明显的期望均衡求解公式。通过设定参与人的效用为未知参数并根据期望均衡求解公式,由解不等式组的方法提出了期望均衡分析法。研究表明,此类常用博弈的特殊性致使两种均衡和期望均衡分析计算简洁。实例分析表明,此法可快速计算出博弈的严格纯Nash均衡和期望均衡,由期望均衡分析法给出的结论由传统方法无法得到且更加符合实际。     

Evolutionary Dynamics for Firm's Organizational Mode based on Theory of Learning in Games

This article studies the evolutionary dynamics of the firm's organizational mode by applying the theory of learning in games. It is assumed that the firms are bounded rationally and are myopic, and they choose the organizational mode in terms of their own preferences and the market share of the organizational mode. Considering entry behavior of the firms, this article presents one-population evolutionary dynamics and the adaptive learning algorithm. Furthermore, it turns out that the profit function greatly impact on the evolutionary equilibria. On the basis of the internal spillover effect within the population and external spillover effect of two populations, it develops the corresponding two-population evolutionary dynamics and discusses the evolutionary equilibria and their basins of attraction. Theoretical analysis and numerical examples show that the evolutionary equilibria for the firms' organizational mode depend on the spillover effect from the perspectives of long run.     

Robustness of equilibria in the graph model for conflict resolution

A novel approach for assessing the robustness of an equilibrium in conflict resolution is presented.Roughly,an equilibrium is robust if it is resilient,or resistant to deviation.Robustness assessment is based on a new concept called Level of Freedom,which evaluates the relative freedom of a decision maker to escape an equilibrium.Resolutions of a conflict can be affected by changes in decision makers' preferences,which may destabilize an equilibrium,causing the conflict to evolve.Hence,a conflict may become long-term and thereby continue to evolve,even after reaching an equilibrium.The new robustness measure is used to rank equilibria based on robustness,to facilitate distinguishing equilibria that are relatively sustainable.An absolutely robust equilibrium is a special case in which the level of freedom is at an absolute minimum for each individual stability definition.     

A PRICE DUOPOLY GAME MODEL WITH UNCERTAIN PARAMETERS

1 IntroductionIn the Bayesian game modeIs[1t2], the uncertainty of objectives is described with probability. But sometbe the uncertainty in practice i8 gben by some fuzzy parnders, and theobjectives of players mny not be to mallmize the expected payOffs[3'4'5j. [6,7l discussed themodeIs for endogenous Stackelberg and price leadership under complete infOmation. In [8,9],we studied the Cournot and Stackelberg models with fuzzy parameters. In this paPer, we givea new subjective equllibrinm fo…     

STUDY ON AN SIS EPIDEMIC MODEL WITH TIME VARIANT DELAY

In this paper, we study an SIS epidemic model with a time variant delay. By means of Liapunov functional, some sufficient conditions of global stability to endemic equilibrium and disease free equilibrium have been obtained. The influence of time delay on the stability of equilibria is displayed.     

交易成本与纯交换经济的竞争均衡

研究一个纯交换经济 ,并假定经济中的经济人相互进行商品交易时 ,需要耗费一定量的交易成本 ,因此某些商品的交易市场可能会因为交易成本过高而导致市场关闭 ,这与经典的一般均衡理论中要求市场的完备性形成明显的区别 .文章建立了这样一类纯交换经济的一般均衡模型 ,并在几乎是常规的假设下证明了竞争均衡的存在性 ,这一均衡配置还是有效率的.     

LOCAL AND GLOBAL BIFURCATIONS AND APPLICATIONS IN A PREDATOR-PREY SYSTEM WITH SEVERAL PARAMETERS

A predator-prey system,depending on several parameters,is investigated forbifurcation of equilibria,Hopf bifurcation,global bifurcation occurring saddle connection,and global existence and nonexistence of limit cycles,and changes of the topological structureof trajectory as parameters are varied.     

GLOBAL STABILITY AND HOPF BIFURCATION OF AN SIS EPIDEMIC MODEL WITH TIME DELAYS

1 IntroductionFor epidemic model with delays, many people have done a lot of work and many valuableresults have been obtained. In SIS ePidemiologic models, susceptibles become infectious aftersufficieot contact with an infective and then become susceptible again after they have recoveredfrom the infection. SIS models with a time delay in the infectious class and a constan poWulation size were analyzed by Cooke and Yorke[1] and Greenberg and Hoppensteadt[2J. TheyfOund that aJl solutions a…     

集体消耗公共资源的谋利行为的3种均衡及成员数量对效率的影响

在建立弱再生的资源的再生速度模型和谋利行为对资源的消耗模型的基础上,推导出在谋利行为下的弱再生的公共资源的均衡曲线与均衡模型;利用此模型分析了个人非理性、个人理性及集体理性时的不同均衡点,分析了这些均衡点之间的关系,并且提出引入惩罚函数来实现在集体最优均衡点,从而实现了有利于社会的行为控制.最后讨论了具有公共资源的集体中的成员数量对谋利行为收益的影响,主要得出3点重要结论:[1]在个体数量充分多的情况下,如果没有管理者进行控制,一般都会发展成过度谋利行为,从而对资源造成巨大的危害.[2]税收等惩罚函数的意义,不仅仅是养活政府和社会财富进行再分配,更在于能够对过度谋利行为具有抑制作用.[3]在不影响资源的功能的前提下,应当对公共资源尽可能细小的分割,使占有公共资源的集体尽可能的小.这样可以使保护资源管理成本达到最低,从而使人们的谋利行为的长远效益最大.