电气化工程的社会影响及其文化意蕴

这里针对两个问题展开讨论，一个是工程的社会影响究竟有多大？从历史发展脉络中我们看到了电气化工程促进了人类社会工业化进程；加快了人类社会城市化发展；改变了人类社会农业生产方式；改善了人类社会的生活方式和家庭生活质量；推动了人类社会全球化变迁；但也对生态环境造成相当程度的破坏。另一个问题是电气化工程的社会影响何以可能？通过实证主义、实用主义、历史主义和建构主义等哲学思想，我们看到了在工程中所蕴合的科技理论的逻辑性和经验性；工程运行的实用性和简单性；工程范式的历史性和转换性以度工程实践的建构性和境遇性等文化意蕴。     

The Art of Living with ICTs: The Ethics–Aesthetics of Vulnerability Coping and Its Implications for Understanding and Evaluating ICT Cultures

This essay shows that a sharp distinction between ethics and aesthetics is unfruitful for thinking about how to live well with technologies, and in particular for understanding and evaluating how we cope with human existential vulnerability, which is crucially mediated by the development and use of technologies such as electronic ICTs. It is argued that vulnerability coping is a matter of ethics and art: it requires developing a kind of art and techne in the sense that it always involves technologies and specific styles of experiencing and dealing with vulnerability, which depend on social and cultural context. It is suggested that we try to find better, perhaps less modern styles of coping with our vulnerability, recognize limits to our attempts to “design” our new forms, and explore what kinds of technologies we need for this project.     

从技术思辨到社会哲学——关于虚拟世界研究的方法论转向问题

关于虚拟世界的哲学论争,无论其逻辑起点如何,都步入了一个技术思辨误区。实际上,虚拟技术不仅仅是一种技术工具,更重要的是它嵌入到人类生活的社会文化系统之中,带来了社会关系和人类生活方式的改变。为此,虚拟世界研究的方法论应该从技术思辨转向社会哲学,即在实证基础上对虚拟世界进行形而上的建构。从社会哲学的视野来审视虚拟世界中的一些哲学问题,是有待拓展的新领域。     

"哲学资本"——布迪厄社会理论的"工具箱"

布迪厄是法国当代著名社会学家,更是法国当代著名哲学家。但由于多种原因,我国学界并没有把他作为法国当代著名哲学家来对待,因此,我国学者对布迪厄的哲学思想了解的不多。布迪厄依靠自己拥有的哲学资本①(哲学博士和哲学教师资格文凭),创造性地运用系统论、普遍联系和认识论等哲学思想,使其社会理论凸现出建构的结构主义或结构的建构主义、关系主义和反思性的哲学特征,布迪厄在创立社会理论的过程中,哲学资本起到了工具箱②的作用。     

The Anti-philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice

In recent years a general consensus has been developing in the philosophy of science to the effect that strong social constructivist accounts are unable to adequately account for scientific practice. Recently, however, a number of commentators have formulated an attenuated version of constructivism that purports to avoid the difficulties that plague the stronger claims of its predecessors. Interestingly this attenuated form of constructivism finds philosophical support from a relatively recent turn in the literature concerning scientific realism. Arthur Fine and a number of other commentators have argued that the realism debate ought to be abandoned. The rationale for this argument is that the debate is sterile for it has, it is claimed, no consequence for actual scientific practice, and therefore does not advance our understanding of science or its practice. Recent “softer” accounts of social constructivism also hold a similar agnostic stance to the realism question. I provide a survey of these various agnostic stances and show how they form a general position that I shall refer to as “the anti-philosophical stance”. I then demonstrate that the anti-philosophical stance fails by identifying difficulties that attend its proposal to ban philosophical interpretation. I also provide examples of instances where philosophical stances to the realism question affect scientific practice.     

The Will to Mathematics: Minds, Morals, and Numbers

The 1990s could be called The Decade of Sociology in mathematics education. It was during those years that the sociology of mathematics became a core ingredient of discourse in mathematics education and the philosophy of mathematics and mathematics education. Unresolved questions and uncertainties have emerged out of this discourse that hinge on the key concept of social construction. More generally, what is at issue is the very idea of “the social”. Within the framework of the general problem of “the social”, we want to open a discussion of boundaries and margins in mathematics and mathematics education. By theorizing the divisions of purity and danger, we will be able to better understand the intersection of logic, mathematics, and thinking with gender, race, and class, and morals, ethics, and values in the classroom. The process of transforming the sociology of mathematics and the sociology of mind into pedagogical tools for mathematics educators and philosophers of education has already begun. One of the tasks before us is the development of a more profound and at the same time more practical grasp of “the social”. Our objective in this paper is to move ourselves and our readers in the direction of just such a grasp of the social.     

Pro-Latour

In this comment I want to clarify five topics. The first topic concerns the importance of looking back at the very principles of the foundations of Western society. The second comment argues for the original position of Latour within the field of (social) constructivism. In the third comment, I argue that Haraway adds to the science-politics discussion by elaborating her philosophy beyond dichotomy. In the fourth comment, I argue that the terms ‘objective’ and ‘rational’ are central philosophical concepts which should be retained. Finally I will make the connection between ‘what’ is represented and ‘how’ to represent it.     

The Forgotten Names of Chemical Elements

Chemical elements are the bricks with which Chemistry is build. Their names had a history, but part of it is forgotten or barely known. In this article the forgotten, no more used, never used, and alternatively used names and symbols of the elements are reviewed, bringing to us some surprises and deeper knowledge about the richness of Chemistry. It should be stressed that chemical elements are important not only for chemists but for all people dealing with science. As in any other aspect of our lives, we tend to better understand something by knowing his history. By knowing them we can have a deeply understanding of how science evolves and how it is influenced by our human aspects.     

科学与技术的文化主导权之争及其终结——科学、技术与技科学

20世纪80年代前,人们的共识是:科学在人类文化中占据着主导地位,从而也主导着技术,其哲学基础是科学实在论。20世纪80年代,随着社会建构论的出现,技术逐渐取代科学,占据主导地位。从认识论的角度来看,这种主导权之争实际上是基于不会有答案的实在论与建构论之争。从科学实践的角度,基于辩证的新本体论的技科学,则会消解这种无果之争。     

What is Sustainable Theory? A Luhmannian Perspective on the Science of Conceptual Systems

Sustainability is an important topic for understanding and developing our society (including business, government, and NGOs). For scholars who want their academic contributions to have an impact, sustainability is important for our conceptual systems (including theories, models, and policies). Because our conceptual systems share similarities with our social systems, we may investigate their characteristics to gain insight into how both may be achieved or at least understood. Theories of the humanities as well as the social/behavioral sciences are changing very rapidly. They are fragile and few seem to have any longevity. At the same time, the theoretical base does not seem to be “advancing.” They are not supporting highly effective results in the real world, so we continue to have seemingly insolvable problems such as crime, war, and poverty. This may be because academia has become inward-focused or, in Luhmann’s terminology, autonomous from the outside world. In seeking to understand how to develop more sustainable theories we found that the concept of sustainability is contested. And, in the process of comparing the sustainability of social systems to the sustainability of theories, we came to realize that neither perspective is viable. Drawing on Luhmann’s insights on the interdependence of theories and society, we came to realize that the two exist in a coevolutionary relationship. Importantly, we present an approach for measuring that evolution and suggest directions for accelerating the coevolutionary advance of society and science.     

Discovering the Principle of Finality in Computational Machines

In this essay we argue that the notion of machine necessarily includes its being designed for a purpose. Therefore, being a mechanical system is not enough for being a machine. Since the experimental scientific method excludes any consideration of finality on methodological grounds, it is then also insufficient to fully understand what machines are. Instead in order to understand a machine it is first required to understand its purpose, along with its structure, in clear parallel with Aristotle’s final and formal causes. Obviously, purpose and structure are not machine components that can physically interact with other components; nonetheless they are essential to understanding their operation. This casts an interesting light on the relationship between mind and body: for just as an artifact’s finality and structure explain its operation, so also consciousness is the explanation—not the efficient cause—of specifically human behavior. What machines and human beings have in common is that, in order to understand them, it is necessary to appeal to the principle of finality. Yet while finality is given and extrinsic in the case of machines, we human beings are characterized by the ability to self-propose our own ends. Since the principle of finality is essential to understanding the production of machines, the traditional view in modern Western philosophy that finality lies beyond the scope of objective/scientific knowledge should be rectified to allow for a genuine science of the artificial. We think a correct understanding of final causality will overcome current resistance to this principle.     

An Observing Science

In this paper I make the arguments that I seesupporting a view of how we can come to knowthe world we live in. I start from a position in second ordercybernetics which turns out to be a RadicalConstructivist position. This position isessentially epistemological, and much of thispaper is concerned with the act of knowing,crucial when we try to develop an understandingof what we mean when we discuss a field ofknowing (knowledge), which is at the root ofscience. The argument follows a path in which I discussthe essential role of the observer inobserving, the creation of constancies betweendifferent observings and their exteriorisationas objects which are then represented and usedin communication with and between otherobservers, each unique (and therefore eachobserving in its own way). This leads to theassertion that the qualities we associate withthe objects of our universes are attributes,rather than properties inherent in the objectsthemselves. At each step in the argument I exploreconsequences for how we understand the world,in particular through science. I showlimitations, new insights and understandings,and re-evaluate what we can expect to gain fromscience. One change is the shift from noun toverb in the consideration of processses – forinstance, the study of living rather than life.In this way, I intend to show not only thatRadical Constructivism is sensible, but that itdoes not preclude us having a science. Incontrast, it can enrich science by taking onboard the sensible.In the process, which science is seen to be themore basic is challenged.     

建构主义与主体性

建构主义与主体性密切联系在一起.随着主体性概念的变化,建构主义也呈现出不同的样式.在原初意义上,建构主义是关于概念起源的分析,这种分析和客观性相连,在社会建构主义那里,建构主义作为形而上的原则存在着,对科学知识给予了不同于现代视野的理解,科学知识是社会建构的产物.从根本上来说,这是一个与主体性概念变化相关的逐渐走向相对主义的过程.     

Radical Constructivism in Biology and Cognitive Science

This article addresses the issue of “objectivism vs constructivism” in two areas,biology and cognitive science, which areintermediate between the natural sciences suchas physics (where objectivism is dominant) andthe human and social sciences (whereconstructivism is widespread). The issues inbiology and in cognitive science are intimatelyrelated; in each of these twin areas, the “objectivism vs constructivism” issue isinterestingly and rather evenly balanced; as aresult, this issue engenders two contrastingparadigms, each of which has substantialspecific scientific content. The neo-Darwinianparadigm in biology is closely resonant withthe classical cognitivist paradigm in cognitivescience, and both of them are intrinsicallyobjectivist. The organismic paradigm inbiology, based on the concept of autopoiesis,is consonant with the paradigm of “enaction” incognitive science; the latter paradigms are bothprofoundly constructivist.In cognitive science, the objectivism vsconstructivism issue is internal to thescientific field itself and reflexivity isinescapable. At this level, strong ontologicalobjectivism is self-contradictory and thereforeuntenable. Radical constructivism isself-coherent; but it also rehabilitatesa weak form of objectivism as a pragmaticallyviable alternative. In conclusion, there is aneven-handed reciprocity between “objectivist”and “constructivist” perspectives. Finally, thearticle examines the consequences of thisconclusion for fields other than cognitivescience: biology; physics and the naturalsciences; and the human and social sciences.     

Abstraction and Insight: Building Better Conceptual Systems to Support More Effective Social Change

When creating theory to understand or implement change at the social and/or organizational level, it is generally accepted that part of the theory building process includes a process of abstraction. While the process of abstraction is well understood, it is not so well understood how abstractions “fit” together to enable the creation of better theory. Starting with a few simple ideas, this paper explores one way we work with abstractions. This exploration challenges the traditionally held importance of abstracting concepts from experience. That traditional focus has been one-sided—pushing science toward the discovery of data without the balancing process that occurs with the integration of the data. Without such balance, the sciences have been pushed toward fragmentation. Instead, in the present paper, new emphasis is placed on the relationship between abstract concepts. Specifically, this paper suggests that a better theory is one that is constructed of concepts that exist on a similar level of abstraction. Suggestions are made for quantifying this claim and using the insights to enable scholars and practitioners to create more effective theory.     

Sustainability Transitions and the Nature of Technology

For more than 20?years, sustainable development has been advocated as a way of tackling growing global environmental and social problems. The sustainable development discourse has always had a strong technological component and the literature boasts an enormous amount of debate on which technologies should be developed and employed and how this can most efficiently be done. The mainstream discourse in sustainable development argues for an eco-efficiency approach in which a technology push strategy boosts efficiency levels by a factor 10 and more in industrialised and developing countries. A minority argues for a socio-cultural lifestyle switch, relying on new values, quality of life, sufficiency and redistribution strategies, with calls for appropriate and soft technologies. It is remarkable, however, that the articles, books and policy debates on sustainability seldom explicitly draw in a discussion of the nature of technology, how technology influences and is influenced by society, and what this implies for sustainable development. The mainstream interprets technology as neutral and instrumental: technology is no more than an instrument to reach a goal; it cannot be judged on its intrinsic characteristics, only on its use. The alternative view often builds on an autonomous and substantive interpretation of technology: technology is an autonomous, almost uncontrollable power that fundamentally reshapes our culture. A more balanced approach seems to be growing in the research on socio-technical sustainability transitions where the focus shifts to the co-evolution of technology and society, and to the networks, seamless webs and complex multi-actor processes that may carry a sustainability transition forward. This approach builds on insights from recent traditions in the philosophy and sociology of technology, in particular the social construction of technology (SCOT) and actor-network theory (ANT). While this provides for a better understanding of the nature and potential role of technology in sustainability policies, it remains to be seen whether it will actually influence the choice between technologies. This article investigates the different conceptualisations of technology in the sustainability debate. It first distinguishes between different approaches of sustainability and how these are related to differing views on technology. It then moves on to how the socio-technical transitions research incorporates insights from contemporary philosophy and sociology of technology. It reflects on the potential of transitions research to give guidance in technology choices, suggesting that the transition approach might be strengthened by drawing in insights from critical theory of technology and by taking a more political stance in defining sustainable development.     

哲学社会科学繁荣发展的技术路线问题探讨

近些年来,我国在经济建设方面取得了举世瞩目的成就.但是,在哲学社会科学领域,与发达国家相比,还有着非常大的距离.近一个时期以来,中央把繁荣哲学社会科学作为一项重要战略目标提了出来.但是,这条道路应当如何走,却是一个必须引起深思的问题.本文试图从技术路线角度来探讨繁荣哲学社会科学路径.因为,在我们看来,哲学社会科学的繁荣发展需要适当的技术手段,哲学社会科学技术路线也需要适当的支撑环境与条件.     

Physics Develops Unaffected by Constructivism

The way physics and other parts of science work can be explained in the framework of radical constructivism. However, this constructivist view itself shows that a uniquily accepted epistemology, constructivism or any other, would not be an advantage for the developmentof science. Unlike physics some parts of science successfully use constructivist concepts inside their theories. Because this is the case particularly in learning theory, constructivist ideas can help to improve physics teaching.     

炎症反应，健康卫士还是癌症帮凶？

任何事物都具有两面性，炎症反应也不例外。作为生物体内最常见的生理反应之一，炎瘟反应不仅可以消除细菌、病毒等外界因素的入侵，还是免疫系统用于清除病变细胞的工具，从而保证机体健康；另一方面，炎症可以促进肿瘤的发展、转移和恶变。解析炎症反应和癌症的关系，了解其中的分子机制，有助于发展新的预防和治疗癌症的方法。     

Physics, Theoretical Knowledge and Weinberg's Grand Reductionism

The two main points of this contribution are the following: (1) Applied mathematical theories might complement physical theories in an essential way; some applied mathematical theories allow us to understand phenomena we are unable to explain by resorting to physical theories alone, (2) In the case of social sciences it might be necessary to account for examined phenomena by resorting to the idea of goal-oriented activity (the causal approach typical for natural science might be unsatisfactory). Weinberg's idea of grand reductionism ignores the two above mentioned facts and hence overestimates the foundational role of physics and its methodology.