绿蓝悖论：证据效力消失的界限?

诺顿近年来系统地发展了一种新确证理论,反对将归纳推理形式化,并且认为诸如简单性这样的理论评价标准也不是普遍有效的;相反,一切归纳推理都是局部性的,并且归纳推理只能通过局部有效的事实性证据得到辩护。以实质归纳理论为基础,诺顿给出了两个解决绿蓝悖论的方案。在他的第一个解决方案中,他认为可以从经验证据的角度打破绿蓝悖论的困境;但是在他的第二个方案中,他认为在想象的时空膨胀情况下,没有任何经验证据能够对相互矛盾的假说进行区分。绿蓝悖论成为经验证据效力消失的边界。但是,在诺顿的实质归纳理论中,实际上也需要预设某种普遍性的条件。     

当代引力理论中的特设性假说问题

为应对广义相对论在理论和经验上面临的困难,有些物理学家选择对广义相对论进行修正,提出了一系列替代引力理论;有些物理学家则选择通过引入暗物质、暗能量和暴涨等暗因子来保留广义相对论。不同引力理论的支持者彼此攻击其竞争理论中引入了特设性假说。特设性假说问题在当代引力理论中展现出了新情况。替代引力理论中的修正牛顿引力理论不能被简单地视为引入了特设性假说。暗因子假说在奎因和尤利安,以及勒普林所给出的特设性假说判定标准下,不能被视为是特设性的;但在波普尔的特设性假说标准下,如果相关暗因子得不到经验证实的话,暗因子假说将会是特设性的。     

索伯的简单性原则述评

简单性原则作为真理的标志为人类所偏爱,美国当代著名科学哲学家艾利奥特·索伯(Elliott Sober)追溯了简单性原则的哲学渊源并对此问题进行了深刻的探讨.在此基础上,他进一步研究了简单性原则在科学假说评价与模型选择标准中所起的重要作用.     

绿蓝悖论和证据定义的困境

绿蓝悖论是检验证据理论的一块试金石,而阿钦斯坦(Peter Achinstein)是一个致力于建构系统的证据理论并且先后提出了两个关于绿蓝悖论解决方案的学者。他早期追随卡尔纳普的研究纲领,认为产生绿蓝悖论的原因是因为"绿蓝"是一个时态谓词。这种解悖方案比较有代表性,耶和科尔(Gal Yehezkel)在2016年提出的解悖方案也属于这个研究路径。但是阿钦斯坦后来承认早期的解悖论方案是失败的,并且从证据理论的角度提出了一个新的解悖方案,认为问题的关键在于"绿蓝"的析取性质对提取证据的选择程序提出了特殊的要求。这种研究范式的转变反映了证据理论的一个困境:证据定义总是不充分的。     

绿蓝悖论解决方案探析

本文首先简要介绍了古德曼的绿蓝悖论,以及卡尔纳普的解决方案和古德曼的投射理论;其次,对两位学者解决绿蓝悖论的方案进行了评价,即孔宪中先生的解决方法和陈晓平教授的解决方法,指出他们的方法最终还是无法消除绿蓝悖论;最后,在借鉴著名科学哲学家库恩的范式理论基础上,提出了自己的一种粗浅的解决方案.     

必须摒弃归纳推理的形式规则吗?

绿蓝悖论是现代归纳逻辑研究的一个重大事件,它直接挑战了归纳的逻辑基础,迫使人们重新思考现代归纳逻辑的发展方向的问题.近年来,归纳逻辑的研究出现了两种截然不同的研究取向.而在某种意义上,它们都是对绿蓝悖论的最新回应.一方面,以诺顿为代表的实质归纳理论主张彻底摒弃归纳的形式化规则,认为应当把归纳推理研究的重心集中到经验事实...     

斯克拉的短暂的不充分决定论探析

斯克拉反对激进的不充分决定论,认为其依赖的经验等价理论并非真正可供科学家选择的理论。他提出短暂的不充分决定论指出,已有观察证据不足以使我们决定选择,即使是现有最佳的科学假说,因为其面临着尚未诞生的假说的挑战,未来的科学家会根据新观察证据的确证选择其中的一个。为了应对这一温和的怀疑论,我们可以根据保守性等合理性标准暂时持有现有假说,并通过重构其结构和形式,寻求通向真理的可能路径。斯坦福进一步提出了潜在可选理论问题,力图更连贯地看待科学理论和理论的更替。     

回溯推理与经济解释

皮尔士提出的回溯推理是根据事实尝试性地提出理论假说,应用演绎推理从前提推出一些结论,作出预言,然后,根据实验来验证.如果预言得到实验的证实,那么,我们可以在一定程度上接受这一假说,把它转化为理论.回溯推理是一类独立的逻辑推理形式,其特点在于作出最佳解释.最佳解释推理要求具备一致性、简单性、类比性等特点.回溯推理在经济解释和经济学方法论中比归纳和演绎更为适用.     

关于科学理论的检验

当一个科学工作者在确定了研究题目以后,第一步工作是尽可能全面地收集有关文献,详细地占有材料,其中最重要的是收集、考察、检查为解决这个问题所提出的已知的假说和理论(解决办法、解决方案)。一般说来,在科学工作者面前有许多可供选择的假说或理论,象库恩所说在常规科学时期只有一种规范这种情况并不多见。对这些可供选择的假说或理论我们要进行评价,从中选择最优者作为我们工作的基础,对于假说、理论的评价可分两步:第一步是实践检验前的评价,第二步是实践检验的评价,当然第二步尤为重要。     

"绿蓝"悖论有解吗?——一个哲学的回答

古德曼的绿蓝悖论一经提出,便激起了来自逻辑学领域的回应,并给出了各种解决方案。但这些方案却在逻辑层面上不约而同地走入了困境,使我们不得不重新面对“绿蓝悖论有解吗”这个问题。本文试图通过对绿蓝悖论的代表性解决方案的考察,以文本解读为基探寻逻辑解决困境的根源,并借助于对绿蓝悖论的哲学重置,揭示其深层哲学蕴含从而给出一种哲学的回答。     

Understanding Natural Science Based on Abductive Inference: Continental Drift

This study aims to understand scientific inference for the evolutionary procedure of Continental Drift based on abductive inference, which is important for creative inference and scientific discovery during problem solving. We present the following two research problems: (1) we suggest a scientific inference procedure as well as various strategies and a criterion for choosing hypotheses over other competing or previous hypotheses; aspects of this procedure include puzzling observation, abduction, retroduction, updating, deduction, induction, and recycle; and (2) we analyze the “theory of continental drift” discovery, called the Earth science revolution, using our multistage inference procedure. Wegener’s Continental Drift hypothesis had an impact comparable to the revolution caused by Darwin’s theory of evolution in biology. Finally, the suggested inquiry inference model can provide us with a more consistent view of science and promote a deeper understanding of scientific concepts.     

Coherence of Our Best Scientific Theories

Putnam in Realism in mathematics and Elsewhere, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1975) infers from the success of a scientific theory to its approximate truth and the reference of its key term. Laudan in Philos Sci 49:19–49 (1981) objects that some past theories were successful, and yet their key terms did not refer, so they were not even approximately true. Kitcher in The advancement of science, Oxford University Press, New York (1993) replies that the past theories are approximately true because their working posits are true, although their idle posits are false. In contrast, I argue that successful theories which cohere with each other are approximately true, and that their key terms refer. My position is immune to Laudan’s counterexamples to Putnam’s inference and yields a solution to a problem with Kitcher’s position.     

Why Should We Be Pessimistic About Antirealists and Pessimists?

The pessimistic induction over scientific theories (Poincaré in Science and hypothesis, Dover, New York, 1905/1952) holds that present theories will be overthrown as were past theories. The pessimistic induction over scientists (Stanford in Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) holds that present scientists cannot conceive of future theories just as past scientists could not conceive of present theories. The pessimistic induction over realists (Wray in Synthese 190(18):4321–4330, 2013) holds that present realists are wrong about present theories just as past realists were wrong about past theories. The pessimistic induction over antirealist theories (Park in Organon F 21(1):3–21, 2014) holds that the latest antirealist explanation of the success of science (Lyons in Philos Sci 70(5):891–901, 2003) has hidden problems just as its eight predecessors did. In this paper, I (1) criticize the pessimistic inductions over scientific theories, scientists, and realists, (2) introduce a pessimistic induction over antirealist theories, and then (3) construct two new pessimistic inductions. One is a pessimistic induction over antirealists according to which the author of the latest antirealist proposal cannot see hidden problems with his proposal just as his antirealist predecessors could not see hidden problems with their proposals. The other is the pessimistic induction over pessimists according to which since past pessimists have been wrong about their present scientific theories from the early twentieth century to the early twenty-first century, future pessimists will also be wrong about their present scientific theories from the early twenty-first century to the early twenty-second century.     

Embodied Anomaly Resolution in Molecular Genetics: A Case Study of RNAi

Scientific anomalies are observations and facts that contradict current scientific theories and they are instrumental in scientific theory change. Philosophers of science have approached scientific theory change from different perspectives as Darden (Theory change in science: Strategies from Mendelian genetics, 1991) observes: Lakatos (In: Lakatos, Musgrave (eds) Criticism and the growth of knowledge, 1970) approaches it as a progressive “research programmes” consisting of incremental improvements (“monster barring” in Lakatos, Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematical discovery, 1976), Kuhn (The structure of scientific revolutions, 1996) observes that changes in “paradigms” are instigated by a crisis from some anomaly, and Hanson (In: Feigl, Maxwell (eds) Current issues in the philosophy of science, 1961) proposes that discovery does not begin with hypothesis but with some “problematic phenomena requiring explanation”. Even though anomalies are important in all of these approaches to scientific theory change, there have been only few investigations into the specific role anomalies play in scientific theory change. Furthermore, much of these approaches focus on the theories themselves and not on how the scientists and their experiments bring about scientific change (Gooding, Experiment and the making of meaning: Human agency in scientific observation and experiment, 1990). To address these issues, this paper approaches scientific anomaly resolution from a meaning construction point of view. Conceptual integration theory (Fauconnier and Turner, Cogn Sci 22:133–187, 1996; The way we think: Conceptual blending and mind’s hidden complexities, 2002) from cognitive linguistics describes how one constructs meaning from various stimuli, such as text and diagrams, through conceptual integration or blending. The conceptual integration networks that describe the conceptual integration process characterize cognition that occurs unconsciously during meaning construction. These same networks are used to describe some of the cognition while resolving an anomaly in molecular genetics called RNA interference (RNAi) in a case study. The RNAi case study is a cognitive-historical reconstruction (Nersessian, In: Giere (ed) Cognitive models of science, 1992) that reconstructs how the RNAi anomaly was resolved. This reconstruction traces four relevant molecular genetics publications in describing the cognition necessary in accounting for how RNAi was resolved through strategies (Darden 1991), abductive reasoning (Peirce, In: Hartshorne, Weiss (eds) Collected papers, 1958), and experimental reasoning (Gooding 1990). The results of the case study show that experiments play a crucial role in formulating an explanation of the RNAi anomaly and the integration networks describe the experiments’ role. Furthermore, these results suggest that RNAi anomaly resolution is embodied. It is embodied in a sense that cognition described in the cognitive-historical reconstruction is experientially based.

假说的经验支持与理论支持之间的张力——从范式理论和贝叶斯方法的角度看

一个科学假说的确立受到两方面的支持,即经验支持和理论支持。在检验假说的过程中既会出现经验和理论同时支持的情况,也会出现二者作用相反的情况。库恩范式理论和贝叶斯方法可用于说明这两种支持之间的张力关系。根据范式理论,在常规科学时期,理论支持对于假说的确立起着决定性的作用;在科学革命时期,经验支持对于假说的确立起着决定性的作用。贝叶斯方法则通过假说的验前概率和验后概率提供了一种将经验支持和理论支持综合起来的检验模式。     

科学发现的本质及其逻辑机制的再发现

不管对科学发现进行语义分析，还是对科学发现活动本身进行历史探究，我们都会发现，科学发现除了具有社会、历史和心理上的属性外，它在本质上乃是新假说的产生、选择、修正、接受和解释的逻辑过程，其逻辑机制正是皮尔士与汉森等所倡导的溯因推理。而且，现代认知科学的新成果促进了溯因推理形式的不断完善，人们意识到在新假说产生与选择中背景理论与背景知识的重要作用，创新了溯因推理的推理形式，令人满意地回答了溯因推理何以能够以及如何能够成为科学发现的逻辑的问题。     

科技人员的压力分析及压力管理

随着社会变化和竞争的日益加剧,科学技术研究人员感到来自各方面的压力越来越大,如何认识和解决这一问题,具有重要的理论探讨和应用价值.本文根据科技创造心理学和压力管理理论,运用逻辑推理分析方法对科学研究人员的压力进行理论分析,并提出了若干管理对策.     

奎因的整体知识论及其后果

奎因通过“语义上溯”,在“观察句”和“观察陈述”层面上建立外部刺激与科学理论之间的证据联系来解决知识论问题。奎因认为,由于观察范畴的假并不提供结论性的反驳,因而在理论和预言矛盾的情况下,我们绝不能指出某些引起这些矛盾的句子,相反,科学理论始终是作为整体的系统要么受到怀疑,要么被修正;科学认识中没有分析命题和综合命题的区分,也没有还原论的确证路径,哲学家和科学家在一条破船上航行,没有起点也没有终点。     

Gould, Hull, and the Individuation of Scientific Theories

When is conceptual change so significant that we should talk about a new theory, not a new version of the same theory? We address this problem here, starting from Gould’s discussion of the individuation of the Darwinian theory. He locates his position between two extremes: ‘minimalist’—a theory should be individuated merely by its insertion in a historical lineage—and ‘maximalist’—exhaustive lists of necessary and sufficient conditions are required for individuation. He imputes the minimalist position to Hull and attempts a reductio: this position leads us to give the same ‘name’ to contradictory theories. Gould’s ‘structuralist’ position requires both ‘conceptual continuity’ and descent for individuation. Hull’s attempt to assimilate into his general selectionist framework Kuhn’s notion of ‘exemplar’ and the ‘semantic’ view of the structure of scientific theories can be used to counter Gould’s reductio, and also to integrate structuralist and population thinking about conceptual change.     

初议工程伦理学的建设方向——来自生命伦理学的启示

我国工程伦理学正值"起步"阶段,其学科建设方向是一个热门话题。生命伦理学已经在我国"起飞",其理论和体制化建设都取得瞩目成绩,并已在医学和生命科学技术研发中开始发挥对实践的指导和规范作用。借鉴生命伦理学20年的建设经验,就工程伦理学的建设提出几个建议:工程伦理学不能等同于工程师职业伦理;工程伦理学以实践为指向,但仍然需要构建本学科的基本原则和基本方法;工程伦理学在其体制化建设中,可以借鉴生命伦理委员会的建制,通过工程评估委员会对工程合理性的评估,发挥工程伦理学宏观层面的决策指导作用。