| 审计服务市场中监督博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 李艳玲,潘杰义.审计服务市场中监督博弈分析[J].西安工程科技学院学报,2004,18(3):254-257. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李艳玲 潘杰义 |
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| 作者单位： | 西北工业大学管理学院,陕西西安710072 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对审计工作中博弈方1-注册会计师与博弈方2-被审计单位之间监督审计问题，建立了监督博弈模型，应用该模型对双方在审计过程中出现的四种情况作了分析，由模型给出了规范我国注册会计师行业和会计信息披露的几点建议．
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| 关 键 词： | 注册会计师 被审计单位 博弈 纯策略 混合策略 纳什均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-850X(2004)03-0254-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年3月26日 |
Analyzing a supervisory game in the market of audit service |
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| LI Yan-ling,PAN Jie-yi.Analyzing a supervisory game in the market of audit service[J].Journal of Xi an University of Engineering Science and Technology,2004,18(3):254-257. |
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| Authors: | LI Yan-ling PAN Jie-yi |
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| Abstract: | Based on the problem about supervisory audit between the player 1-Certified Public Accountant and the player 2-audited units, a model of supervisory game is constructed. At the same time,four situations are analyzed which come from the process of audit by using the model. Finally,several suggestions are advised on how to constraint the field of CPA and the disclosure of financial and accounting information in China. |
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| Keywords: | Certified Public Accountant audited units game pure strategy mixed strategy Nash equilibrium |
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