基于无条件分位回归的民营上市公司高管薪酬问题研究

高级管理人员的薪酬作为现代企业委托代理关系中的核心问题一直是社会的焦点.本文以我国民营上市公司为样本,首先研究了公司规模、每股收益、营业收入、流动负债和高管持股比例作用于高管薪酬不同分位点处的条件分位偏效应,结果表明它们在不同分位水平下的影响各异;然后为了获得这些因素的一般边际影响,利用无条件分位回归分析了它们的无条件分位偏效应,结果指出公司规模、每股收益和营业收入与各个分位水平的高管薪酬呈不同程度的正相关而流动负债则为负相关,高管持股比例与低分位水平的高管薪酬正相关而对中高分位水平的影响不显著;最后对相关结果进行了对比,发现每个影响因素的条件和无条件分位偏效应有所区别,并且无条件分位偏效应的解释意义更具有现实价值.

Study on executive compensation of private listed companies based on unconditional quantile regression

The executive compensation, as the core problem in the principal-agent relationship of modern enterprises, has always been the focus of the society. Taking private listed companies as samples, this paper first studies the conditional quantile partial effects of company size, earnings per share, taking, current liability and executive shareholding proportion on executive compensation at different quantile levels by using conditional quantile regression, and the results show that their effects are various at different quantile levels. Then, in order to obtain the general marginal effects of these factors, their unconditional quantile partial effects are analyzed by using unconditional quantile regression. We find that company size, earnings per share and taking have diverse positive correlations with executive compensation at different quantile levels, while current liability is negatively correlated. Executive shareholding proportion is positively related to the executive compensation at low quartile levels, but its effects on the middle and high quartile levels are not significant. Finally, the relative results are compared and it is found that the conditional quantile partial effect and unconditional quantile partial effect of every influencing factor are different, and unconditional quantile partial effects have more realistic value.