针对FPGA实现的AES密码芯片的相关性电磁分析攻击

通过研究相关性电磁分析(CEMA)攻击方法, 构建电磁泄漏信息采集和数据处理平台, 对基于现场可编程门阵列(FPGA)实现的AES-128密码算法进行近场相关性电磁分析攻击。攻击结果表明, 该平台能够获取密码芯片工作时的电磁泄漏信息，并通过分析获取AES第10轮加密的全部16个字节密钥。经过优化数据处理, 相关性电磁分析攻击的效率得到很大提高, 攻击所需的数据组数大大下降。

Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks against an FPGA Implementation of AES

To study the vulnerability of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) against electromagnetic side channel attacks, based on the method of correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) attack, the authors built a platform to acquire EM emanation and process data, then performed a near-field CEMA attack against an FPGA implementation of AES-128. The results indicate that the platform is able to acquire the EM emanation of the encryption chip, and can retrieve all the 16 bytes of the 10th roundkey of AES. After the optimization of processing data, the efficiency of CEMA is highly enhanced, namely the data needed to exploit the correct roundkey is greatly reduced.