The invention of atmosphere

The word “atmosphere” was a neologism Willebrord Snellius created for his Latin translation of Simon Stevin's cosmographical writings. Astronomers and mathematical practitioners, such as Snellius and Christoph Scheiner, applying the techniques of Ibn Mu‘ādh and Witelo, were the first to use the term in their calculations of the height of vapors that cause twilight. Their understandings of the atmosphere diverged from Aristotelian divisions of the aerial region. From the early years of the seventeenth century, the term was often associated with atomism or corpuscular matter theory. The concept of the atmosphere changed dramatically with the advent of pneumatic experiments in the middle of the seventeenth century. Pierre Gassendi, Walter Charleton, and Robert Boyle transformed the atmosphere of the mathematicians giving it the characteristics of weight, specific gravity, and fluidity, while disputes about its extent and border remained unresolved.     

‘Good Sense’ in context: A response to Kidd

In his response to my (2010), Ian Kidd claims that my argument against Stump’s interpretation of Duhem’s concept of ‘good sense’ is unsound because it ignores an important distinction within virtue epistemology. In light of the distinction between reliabilist and responsibilist virtue epistemology, Kidd argues that Duhem can be seen as supporting the latter, which he further illustrates with a discussion of Duhem’s argument against ‘perfect theory’. I argue that no substantive argument is offered to show that the distinction is relevant and can establish that Duhem’s ‘good sense’ can be understood within responsibilist virtue epistemology. I furthermore demonstrate that Kidd’s attempt to support his contention relies on a crucial misreading of Duhem’s general philosophy of science, and in doing so highlight the importance of understanding ‘good sense’ in its original context, that of theory choice.     

Pierre Duhem’s epistemic aims and the intellectual virtue of humility: a reply to Ivanova

David Stump (2007) has recently argued that Pierre Duhem can be interpreted as a virtue epistemologist. Stump’s claims have been challenged by Milena Ivanova (2010) on the grounds that Duhem’s ‘epistemic aims’ are more modest than those of virtue epistemologists. I challenge Ivanova’s criticism of Stump by arguing that she not distinguish between ‘reliabilist’ and ‘responsibilist’ virtue epistemologies. Once this distinction is drawn, Duhem clearly emerges as a ‘virtue-responsibilist’ in a way that complements Ivanova’s positive proposal that Duhem’s ‘good sense’ reflects a conception of the ‘ideal scientist’. I support my proposal that Duhem is a ‘virtue-responsibilist’ by arguing that his rejection of the possibility of our producing a ‘perfect theory’ reflects the key responsibilist virtue of ‘intellectual humility’.     

布尔迪厄对文学艺术的“祛魅”——以“审美趣味”（taste）和“文化生产者”（producer）例

布尔迪厄从自己独具特色的社会学研究出发，对传统文学艺术进行了一次“祛魅”。他打破了康德的普遍性的审美幻像，展示了“审美趣味”（taste）的历史生成特征和“社会区隔”的功能，引入“习性”概念，阐明了“合法性趣味”（1egitimateaes—thetics）与“纯粹审美趣味”（puretaste）的真实涵义，完成了对康德式“审美趣味”的颠覆。通过对文学艺术场的阐释，他打破了对于传统“创作者”的迷信，将艺术家还原为只是场中从事生产和再生产的生产者。在他的“纯粹凝视”（puregaze）观念的考察中，我们可以发现他在文学自律性这个问题上带有某种程度的反思性与批判性的回归。     

不同家系交趾黄檀种子萌发及幼苗生长差异

【目的】揭示交趾黄檀种子特性、变异规律及其对苗期生长的影响,筛选交趾黄檀优良家系。【方法】对来源于泰国的32个交趾黄檀家系的种子形态(种子长、种子宽、种子厚、千粒质量),发芽特征(发芽率、发芽势、发芽指数)和苗期生长性状(苗高、地径、生物量)进行综合评价分析。【结果】32个交趾黄檀家系种子表型性状变异丰富,不同种子形态性状在家系间均达到显著水平差异,千粒质量变幅为18.04～32.93 g(表型变异系数12.88%)。交趾黄檀发芽率、发芽势、发芽指数和苗期生长性状差异显著。千粒质量与苗高、地径呈显著正相关。综合相关性和隶属函数评价分析表明,20号、23号、18号家系综合表现较好。【结论】32个交趾黄檀家系在表型性状方面存在较大差异,20号家系在苗期生长表现最优,可作为交趾黄檀育苗的首选家系。     

实践与可接受性:布尔迪厄实践语义学的建构

布尔迪厄实践语义学契合了普特南关于可能的语义学建构需要一个精确的关于语言使用者的一般模型的思路。但普特南以语言劳动分工为基础,而布尔迪厄诉诸实践;普特南把意义定义为包含外延在内的向量,继而把决定外延的工作归给了社会,布尔迪厄则把意义界定为价格,而价格取决于语言产品的可接受性。正是这两个区分及其所暗含的社会性视角的深层异质性构成了普特南与布尔迪厄之间的最大差异,也标示了布尔迪厄实践语义学的独特理论风格及其价值所在。     

Pierre Duhem’s virtue epistemology

Duhem’s concept of ‘good sense’ is central to his philosophy of science, given that it is what allows scientists to decide between competing theories. Scientists must use good sense and have intellectual and moral virtues in order to be neutral arbiters of scientific theories, especially when choosing between empirically adequate theories. I discuss the parallels in Duhem’s views to those of virtue epistemologists, who understand justified belief as that arrived at by a cognitive agent with intellectual and moral virtues, showing how consideration of Duhem as a virtue epistemologist offers insights into his views, as well as providing possible answers to some puzzles about virtue epistemology. The extent to which Duhem holds that the intellectual and moral virtues of the scientist determine scientific knowledge has not been generally noticed.     

布迪厄从事人类学研究的缘由、成果及意义

布迪厄的人类学研究及其成就,是当时法国社会与政治条件作用下的结果,更是他的人生阅历及学术旨趣的直接产物。他的人类学成果是多方面的,不仅是其学术思想的灵感来源和认识论反思的基础,而且促成了他“从规则到策略”的转变。可以说,人类学研究是布迪厄一生学术思想的逻辑起点。     

走近"习性"、"资本"和"场"--读《布尔迪厄访谈录》

布尔迪厄以访谈的形式,阐述了在他的理论体系中起核心组织作用的三个概念"习性"、"资本"和"场".习性是一个构筑在实践层面上的后天获得的性情系统,是在实践中形成的即兴创作的能力.资本是以同一的形式和扩大的形式获取利润的潜在能力,它实质上是权力的一种形式.场涉及的是对人们的关系、地位的分析,对行动者占据的位置的多维空间的阐述;每个场都是斗争的场所.