科学发现的本质及其逻辑机制的再发现

不管对科学发现进行语义分析，还是对科学发现活动本身进行历史探究，我们都会发现，科学发现除了具有社会、历史和心理上的属性外，它在本质上乃是新假说的产生、选择、修正、接受和解释的逻辑过程，其逻辑机制正是皮尔士与汉森等所倡导的溯因推理。而且，现代认知科学的新成果促进了溯因推理形式的不断完善，人们意识到在新假说产生与选择中背景理论与背景知识的重要作用，创新了溯因推理的推理形式，令人满意地回答了溯因推理何以能够以及如何能够成为科学发现的逻辑的问题。     

认知神经科学中神经层次的反向推理述介

近些年来,随着功能神经成像技术的广泛应用,认知神经科学家越来越多地运用反向推理策略来建立和评价各种认知假说。科学哲学家们在讨论反向推理的性质时多把反向推理当作演绎或归纳,企图从有效性和可靠性角度来分析反向推理的合理性。分析表明,这个做法是失败的。反向推理中演绎和归纳交织在一起,同时还要参照其他认识论价值标准,应当被理解成一种溯因推理。反向推理作为溯因推理不仅对形成新假说有启发作用,也能够以最佳解释推理的形式对竞争假说做出筛选。     

科学辩护的辩护:从人工智能中的溯因推理看

科学辩护是科学假说转化成科学原理的必经阶段,归纳法是科学辩护的基本模型。旧归纳之谜引出了科学辩护的合理性问题。溯因推理作为一种广义归纳法,同样遭到旧归纳之谜的质疑。除了科学发现功能,溯因推理还可以视为一种有效的科学辩护模型。人工智能中的溯因推理的辩护特征,充分表明归纳推理在方法论上的固有缺陷,尤其是科学确证中的证成问题。对科学辩护进行方法论上的保证,为科学辩护而辩护是十分必要的。     

里普顿的最佳说明推理及其问题

里普顿的最佳说明推理建立在区分实际说明和潜力说明的基础上,这使得推理结果不是一个在前提的支持下更可能为真的说明,而是一个与推理的可靠性无关的最可爱的潜力说明.这个理论产生一系列困难.本文讨论这些困难的起因,并提出将可靠性作为缺省理由的方式有助于克服这些困难.     

回归自然的认知策略——中医诊断的模型化推理及其方法论启示

众所周知,中国传统医学和现代医学在诊断的方法论上存在极大的差别。但长久以来,人们对中医诊断的认识一直比较模糊。“基于模型推理”的概念使我们对中医诊断的推理过程具有了新的和比较清楚的认识。事实上,一个有效的中医诊断相当于一组复杂的假说推论。利用可直观转换的模型系统;基于模型选择模型、锁定假说;颠倒地使用三段论第一式（AAA）,是本文从中医诊断的考察中获得的关于解决假说推论中溯因难题的重要启示。对中医诊断的研究将有助于了解直观模型在人类认识过程中的作用,并推进回归自然的认知研究新策略。     

范·弗拉森反最佳说明推理的无动于衷论证

最佳说明推理的有效性是当前科学哲学研究备受关注的话题.范·弗拉森反驳这种推理的有效性.他通过质询正确的好说明是否在那堆被考虑的可能说明中,表明如果遗漏正确说明,在考虑它时"无动于衷",那就无法认为一堆可能说明中最佳的那个说明是正确的.范·弗拉森对这种推理的理解实际上并不充分.结合他的相关表述,就能看到他的无动于衷论证存...     

创造性溯因推理与科学发现——以现代原子模型的早期发展为例

科学实验中的经验反常往往激起科学家强烈的好奇心,引导科学家进行扩展性探索,以创造解释性假说去合理解释之.创造性溯因是创造新假说的重要机制.现代原子模型的早期发展体现了经验反常、创造性溯因与科学发现之间的密切关系.     

回溯推理与经济解释

皮尔士提出的回溯推理是根据事实尝试性地提出理论假说,应用演绎推理从前提推出一些结论,作出预言,然后,根据实验来验证.如果预言得到实验的证实,那么,我们可以在一定程度上接受这一假说,把它转化为理论.回溯推理是一类独立的逻辑推理形式,其特点在于作出最佳解释.最佳解释推理要求具备一致性、简单性、类比性等特点.回溯推理在经济解释和经济学方法论中比归纳和演绎更为适用.     

皮尔士的溯因之惑

皮尔士将推理与本能看成是溯因同时具有的两个基本特征,但不少科学哲学家认为如果溯因是推理的,那么它就不会是本能的;如果溯因是本能的,那么它就不会是推理的。溯因到底是推理的,还是本能的呢?作为逻辑学家的皮尔士从来就没有放弃对溯因的逻辑追求,溯因是推理的这一点在皮尔士心里始终没有改变。皮尔士溯因中本能概念与推理概念具有一些交互的、相融的性质,本能分享推理的部分性质,不是纯粹心理的,推理与本能的不一致仅仅存在于那些在心理学框架里理解本能的人。     

归纳推理的说明论辩护之辩

最佳说明的推理旨在解决归纳推理的描述性问题和确证性问题,可概括为归纳推理的说明论辩护。说明论基于"说明优先于推理"和"认识上的双重过滤"两个前提,在解决描述性问题和确证性问题方面兼具启发性。然而,批评者从前提、语义和语用等方面对说明论辩护提出了挑战。面对指责,需要明确"说明优先于推理"的含义,表明对说明论的评价不应限于语义约定,说明论的确证功能不应仅限于事实层面,以及反例不会使说明论的辩护毫无价值。     

Understanding Natural Science Based on Abductive Inference: Continental Drift

This study aims to understand scientific inference for the evolutionary procedure of Continental Drift based on abductive inference, which is important for creative inference and scientific discovery during problem solving. We present the following two research problems: (1) we suggest a scientific inference procedure as well as various strategies and a criterion for choosing hypotheses over other competing or previous hypotheses; aspects of this procedure include puzzling observation, abduction, retroduction, updating, deduction, induction, and recycle; and (2) we analyze the “theory of continental drift” discovery, called the Earth science revolution, using our multistage inference procedure. Wegener’s Continental Drift hypothesis had an impact comparable to the revolution caused by Darwin’s theory of evolution in biology. Finally, the suggested inquiry inference model can provide us with a more consistent view of science and promote a deeper understanding of scientific concepts.     

Problems with Peirce's Concept of Abduction

Abductive reasoning takes place in forming``hypotheses' in order to explain ``facts.' Thus, theconcept of abduction promises an understanding ofcreativity in science and learning. It raises,however, also a lot of problems. Some of them will bediscussed in this paper. After analyzing thedifference between induction and abduction (1), Ishall discuss Peirce's claim that there is a ``logic'of abduction (2). The thesis is that this claim can beunderstood, if we make a clear distinction betweeninferential elements and perceptive elements ofabductive reasoning. For Peirce, the creative act offorming explanatory hypotheses and the emergence of``new ideas' belongs exclusively to the perceptive sideof abduction. Thus, it is necessary to study the roleof perception in abductive reasoning (3). A furtherproblem is the question whether there is arelationship between abduction and Peirce's concept of``theorematic reasoning' in mathematics (4). Both formsof reasoning could be connected, because both arebased on perception. The last problem concerns therole of instincts in explaining the success ofabductive reasoning in science, and the questionwhether the concept of instinct might be replaced bymethods of inquiry (5).     

Modelling Abduction in Science by means of a Modal Adaptive Logic

Scientists confronted with multiple explanatory hypotheses as a result of their abductive inferences, generally want to reason further on the different hypotheses one by one. This paper presents a modal adaptive logic MLA ^s that enables us to model abduction in such a way that the different explanatory hypotheses can be derived individually. This modelling is illustrated with a case study on the different hypotheses on the origin of the Moon.     

Abduction as a Logic and Methodology of Discovery: the Importance of Strategies

There are various ``classical' argumentsagainst abduction as a logic of discovery,especially that (1) abduction is too weak amode of inference to be of any use, and (2) inbasic formulation of abduction the hypothesisis already presupposed to be known, so it isnot the way hypotheses are discovered in thefirst place. In this paper I argue, bybringing forth the idea of strategies,that these counter-arguments are weaker thanmay appear. The concept of strategiessuggests, inter alia, that many inferentialmoves are taken into account at the same time.This is especially important in abductivereasoning, which is basically a very weak modeof inference. The importance of strategicthinking can already be seen in Charles S.Peirce's early treatments of the topic, and N.R.Hanson's later writings on abductionalthough they did not use the concept of``strategies.' On the whole, I am arguing thatthe focus should be more on methodologicalprocesses, and not only on validityconsiderations, which have dominated thediscussion about abduction.     

Abduction and Estimation in Animals

One of the most pressing issues in understanding abduction is whether it is an instinct or an inference. For many commentators find it paradoxical that new ideas are products of an instinct and products of an inference at the same time. Fortunately, Lorenzo Magnani’s recent discussion of animal abduction sheds light on both instinctual and inferential character of Peircean abduction. But, exactly for what reasons are Peirce and Magnani so convinced that animal abduction can provide us with a novel perspective? Inspired by Peirce’s and Magnani’s discussions of animal abduction, I propose to compare Peirce’s and Magnani’s views of animal abduction with the estimative power of non-human animals and humans, which was one of the internal senses in medieval psychology.     

哲人科学家眼中的科学理论的认知结构

本文在澄清“科学理论的认知结构”一语含义的基础上,讨论了哲人科学家眼中的科学理论的两种认知结构——经验归纳认知结构和假设演绎认知结构,着重论述了对后者中的基本假设的认知问题。