Genesis of Karl Popper's EPR-like experiment and its resonance amongst the physics community in the 1980s

I present the reconstruction of the involvement of Karl Popper in the community of physicists concerned with foundations of quantum mechanics, in the 1980s. At that time Popper gave active contribution to the research in physics, of which the most significant is a new version of the EPR thought experiment, alleged to test different interpretations of quantum mechanics. The genesis of such an experiment is reconstructed in detail, and an unpublished letter by Popper is reproduced in the present paper to show that he formulated his thought experiment already two years before its first publication in 1982. The debate stimulated by the proposed experiment as well as Popper's role in the physics community throughout 1980s is here analysed in detail by means of personal correspondence and publications.     

Leibniz's Observations on Hydrology: An Unpublished Letter on the Great Lombardy Flood of 1705

Although the historical reputation of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) largely rests on his philosophical and mathematical work, it is widely known that he made important contributions to many of the emerging but still inchoate branches of natural science of his day. Among the many scientific papers Leibniz published during his lifetime are ones on the nascent science we now know as hydrology. While Leibniz's other scientific work has become of increasing interest to scholars in recent years, his thinking about hydrology has been neglected, despite being relatively broad in extent, including as it does papers on the ‘raising of vapours’ and the formation of ice, as well as the separation of salt and fresh water. That list can now be extended still further following the discovery of a previously unpublished letter of Leibniz's on the causes of the devastating Lombardy flood of October and November 1705. This letter, which will be the focus of our paper, reveals the depth of Leibniz's understanding of key hydrological processes. In it, he considers various mechanisms for the flood, such as heavy rains on high ground, underwater earthquakes, and a mountain collapse. Over the course of the paper we examine each of these mechanisms in depth, and show that Leibniz was in the vanguard of hydrological thinking. We also show that the letter contains one of the first scholarly attempts to apply aspects of the still-forming notion of the hydrological cycle to account for a flood event.     

Some observations of Leonardo,Galileo, Mariotte and others relative to size effect

A letter in which astronomer John Flamsteed expounded his unusual views about the causes of earthquakes survives in a number of drafts and copies. Though it was compiled in response to shocks felt in England in 1692 and Sicily in 1693, its relationship to the wide range of comparable theories current in the later seventeenth century must be considered. Flamsteed's suggestion that an ‘earthquake’ might be an explosion in the air was linked with contemporary thinking about the roles of sulphur and nitre in earthquakes underground, and in combustion, respiration, and other processes. It reveals his concern with subjects other than astronomy and the influence of his continuing contact with members of the Royal Society; it also offers an early example of how seventeenth-century work on sulphur and nitre prepared the way for ‘airquake’ and electrical theories associated with the London earthquake of 1750.     

Becker–Blaschke problem of space

In a letter to Weyl, Becker proposed a new way to solve the problem of space in the relativistic context. This is the result of Becker׳s encounter with the two traditions of thinking about space: Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and Blaschke׳s equiaffine differential geometry. I reconstruct the mathematical content of the Becker–Blaschke solution to the problem of space and highlight the philosophical ideas that guide this construction. This permits me to underline some common properties of Riemannian and Minkowskian manifolds in terms of an unusual notion of isotropy. Finally, I will use this construction as a support to analyze several philosophical differences between Weyl׳s and Becker׳s proposals.     

Charles Darwin and the repugnant curators

Recently discovered documents have revealed the background to a letter published in The Darwin Correspondence, dated 21 February 1838 and sent to Charles Darwin and six others from John George Children of the British Museum. It concerned a complaint made by Edward Blyth about George Robert Gray, assistant in charge of birds at the museum. A response by Darwin, and 14 other referees, supported Gray's defence of his character, and the complaint was dismissed. It is concluded that Children investigated this complaint so vigorously because of recent criticism of the natural history collections by witnesses to the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the British Museum (1836–37), who sought to increase the involvement and influence of career scientists in the overseeing of the collections. Children may have also been sensitive to criticism because he was a controversial appointee.     

Galilean argumentation and the inauthenticity of the Cigoli letter on painting vs. sculpture

This essay is partly a case study of the role of logic in historiography. It is also partly a test case for the thesis of a Galilean correspondence between aesthetic attitude and scientific thought, advanced by Panofsky, Koyré, and Heilbron. Intrinsically, it is a discussion of the authenticity of the letter to Cigoli dated 26 June 1612, widely attributed to Galileo, containing argumentation about the relative aesthetic merits of painting and sculpture. I undertake a systematic analysis of the letter’s method of argument, comparing and contrasting it with Galileo’s. I argue that the letter does have some Galilean characteristics: critical reasoning; ad hominem argumentation, in the seventeenth-century sense; and appeal to experimentation. However, the letter falls short of the typical Galilean open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, and clarity; crucially, it uses several illative terms which Galileo never uses, and does not use the one he uses most often. The latter features outweigh the former. Moreover, I discuss some aspects of the letter’s substantive content, primarily a theory of vision that disregards the dynamics of perspective and the faculty of binocularity, which Galileo understood and exploited very well. My novel argument vindicates an old judgment of Favaro, who doubted the letter’s authenticity.     

Three unpublished letters to Charles Darwin: the solution to a ‘geometrico-geological’ problem

While Charles Darwin wrote his Observations on South America, he often sought the advice and help of other scientists in solving specific problems. Three letters that the Cambridge geologist and mathematician William Hopkins wrote to Darwin exemplify such aid. In these letters Hopkins was able to show Darwin how he could calculate the position of the sedimentary beds on the Chonos Archipelago, which Darwin had visited. In his first letter Hopkins sent a solution, part of which eluded Darwin. Darwin's letters to Hopkins have not yet been found, but two additional letters gave Darwin the solution he was looking for.     

The rise of western rationalism: Paul Feyerabend's story

I summarize certain aspects of Paul Feyerabend's account of the development of Western rationalism, show the ways in which that account is supposed to run up against an alternative, that of Karl Popper, and then try to give a preliminary comparison of the two. My interest is primarily in whether what Feyerabend called his ‘story’ constitutes a possible history of our epistemic concepts and their trajectory. I express some grave reservations about that story, and about Feyerabend's framework, finding Popper's views less problematic here. However, I also suggest that one important aspect of Feyerabend's material, his treatment of religious belief, can be given an interpretation which makes it tenable, and perhaps preferable to a Popperian approach.     

Antoni van Leeuwenhoek and measuring the invisible: The context of 16th and 17th century micrometry

This article explores the impact of 16th and 17th-century developments in micrometry on the methods Antoni van Leeuwenhoek employed to measure the microscopic creatures he discovered in various samples collected from his acquaintances and from local water sources. While other publications have presented Leeuwenhoek's measurement methods, an examination of the context of his techniques is missing. These previous measurement methods, driven by the need to improve navigation, surveying, astronomy, and ballistics, may have had an impact on Leeuwenhoek's methods. Leeuwenhoek was educated principally in the mercantile guild system in Amsterdam and Delft. He rose to positions of responsibility within Delft municipal government. These were the years that led up to his first investigations using the single-lens microscopes he became expert at creating, and that led to his first letter to the Royal Society in 1673. He also took measures to train in surveying and liquid assaying practices existing in his time, disciplines that were influenced by Pedro Nunes, Pierre Vernier, Rene Descartes, and others. While we may never know what inspired Leeuwenhoek's methods, the argument is presented that there were sufficient influences in his life to shape his approach to measuring the invisible.     

Instruments of Music,Instruments of Science: Hermann von Helmholtz's Musical Practices,his Classicism,and his Beethoven Sonata

The young Hermann Helmholtz, in an 1838 letter home, declared that he always appreciated music much more when he played it for himself. Though a frequent concert-goer, and celebrated for his highly influential 1863 work on the physiological basis of music theory, Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen, it is likely that Helmholtz's enduring engagement with music began with his initial, personal experience of playing music for himself. I develop this idea, shifting the discussion of Helmholtz's work on sound sensation back to its origins, and examine the role of his material interaction with musical instruments and music itself. In his sound sensation studies, Helmholtz understood sound as an external, physical object. But Helmholtz also conceived of sound in musical terms. Further, Helmholtz's particular musical tastes as well as his deeply personal interaction with musical instruments allowed him to reconcile his conception of sound as physical object with his conception of sound as music. Helmholtz's physiological theory of sound sensation was both the product of and constitutive of how he heard and created sound. I argue that Helmholtz himself was the embodied reconciliation of his physiological theory of sound sensation and his belief that musical aesthetics were historically and culturally contingent.     

Experimentation in the cosmic laboratory

It might seem impossible to apply Ian Hacking's experimental argument for scientific realism to astrophysical objects; indeed Hacking himself expressed scepticism about extragalactic entities. Such astrophysical antirealism has been the subject of intense debate and is usually seen as an undesired consequence of experimental realism. In this paper, I claim that it is possible to recast the experimental argument by reference to James Woodward's non-anthropocentric account of experimentation so as to apply it to astrophysical entities, such as gravitational lenses. I also argue that this new formulation of the experimental argument solves several problems with Hacking's original version.     

A Dispute Over Superposition: John Wallis,Honoré Fabri,and Giovanni Alfonso Borelli

This paper aims first and foremost to unravel and clarify an interesting 17^th century controversy around superposition in projectiles, which allegedly existed between the French Jesuit Honoré Fabri and the Italian physicist and astronomer Giovanni Alfonso Borelli. This conflict – initially described by the English mathematician John Wallis in a letter from 1670 to the secretary of the Royal Society – has been erroneously identified with Fabri's Dialogi physici (1669), a work written in response to Borelli's De vi percussionis (1669). In fact, this “conflict” was nothing but Wallis's account of a contradiction between Borelli's above mentioned work and Fabri's Tractatus physicus de motu locali from 1646, while Fabri's 1669 work expressed views very different from those contained in his Tractatus physicus. I will try here to reconstruct Fabri's change of heart between 1646 and 1669 concerning projectiles and superposition, while tracing the real bone of contention between (the later) Fabri and Borelli – superimposing contrary motions – to its Aristotelian origins. My analysis will lead me to problematize the way modern historians usually interpret the relation between Aristotle's physical thinking and projectile theories of early modern theoreticians (e.g. Nicollò Tartaglia's).     

Thomas Reid on Mathematics and Natural Philosophy

This paper is both (a) an exercise in historical recovery in that it details some of the events surrounding the founding of the City and Guilds of London Institute and describes the way in which the Institute set about the building and running of two of its colleges, the City and Guilds Technical College, Finsbury, and the Central Institution in South Kensington (new archival detail is added to what is already known of this history) and (b) an attempt to interpret the above material in terms of various forms of association within the City Corporation and the guilds. Collectively the City and the guilds made an effort to come to terms with a modernizing world through the means of providing scientific and technical education. The guilds wanted to remain important even though traditional apprenticeship was dying out. In joining in a new venture to provide technical education for young people it was necessary to maintain an order in which the City's presence was clear and apparent. This paper will show how such an order was achieved and, in so doing, it shows something more generally of the relationship of tradition and rhetoric to institution building.     

On the “negative utility” of Ernst Cassirer׳s philosophy of physics: An application to the EPR argument

This paper tries to reconstruct Ernst Cassirer's potential reception of the EPR argument, as exposed by Einstein in his letter to Cassirer of March 1937. It is shown that, in conformity with his transcendental epistemology taking the conditions of accessibility as constitutive of the quantum object, Cassirer would probably have rejected the argument. Indeed, Cassirer would probably not have subscribed to its separability/local causality presupposition (which goes against his interpretation of the quantum formalism as a self-sufficient condition constitutive of the quantum object, without any reliance on spatial intuition), nor to its completeness requirement (as his partial endorsement of Bohr's complementarity, and his rejection of the Kantian "idea of complete determination", illustrate). By rejecting both of its premises, Cassirer's philosophy of physics thus enables to escape the EPR dilemma, and exhibits what, in Kantian terms, might be called a "negative utility" with respect to physical science. A further investigation of the anti-reductionist utility of Cassirer's systematic philosophy with respect to physics and other "symbolic forms" is finally suggested.     

Spectacles improved to perfection and approved of by the Royal Society

The letter sent by the Royal Society to the London optician, John Marshall, in 1694, commending his new method of grinding, has been reprinted, and referred to, in recent years. However, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the method itself, the letter and the circumstances in which it was written, nor the consequences for trade practices. The significance of the approval by the Royal Society of this innovation and the use of that approbation by John Marshall and other practitioners are examined. Gaps in existing accounts of Marshall's method are partly remedied by supplementing surviving written materials with accounts of contemporary, and present-day, trade practices based on his method. The reasons why Marshall and his contemporaries failed to record his method and specify his improvements are discussed. The reactions of the Spectacle Makers' Company and its more prominent members, both to the innovation itself and to the Royal Society's letter, are analysed. The impact of the new technique on contemporary and later opticians is described.     

The timber famine and the development of technology

In March 1912 A. N. Whitehead wrote a letter which sheds new and important light on his own view of his mathematical goals. In this article I publish the letter for the first time and relate its contents not only to his mathematical career but also to his scientific, philosophical and educational interests.     

Two kinds of modification theory of light: Some new observations on the Newton-Hooke controversy of 1672 concerning the nature of light

It has not been sufficiently emphasized that there existed two kinds of modification theory of colours, Aristotle's modification theory and Descartes-Hook's modification theory. This seems to have caused some confusion in the interpretation of the optical controversy between Newton and Hooke in 1672. The aim of the present paper is to prove that these two kinds of modification theory really coexisted, and on that basis to present a new interpretation of the optical controversy of 1672. The characteristics and the historical role of each of these theories will be described. Newton's colour theory was formed under the influence of Aristotle's modification theory, which had been disseminated through the work of an English Gassendist, Walter Charleton. Newton's optical theories were created not only under the influence of Descartes, as we have been often told, but also under the conspicuous influence of corpuscular philosophers.     

Newton's early computational method for dynamics

On December 13, 1679Newton sent a letter toHooke on orbital motion for central forces, which contains a drawing showing an orbit for a constant value of the force. This letter is of great importance, because it reveals the state ofNewton's development of dynamics at that time. Since the first publication of this letter in 1929,Newton's method of constructing this orbit has remained a puzzle particularly because he apparently made a considerable error in the angle between successive apogees of this orbit. In fact, it is shown here thatNewton's implicitcomputation of this orbit is quite good, and that the error in the angle is due mainly toan error of drawing in joining two segments of the oribit, whichNewton related by areflection symmetry. In addition, in the letterNewton describes quite correctly the geometrical nature of orbits under the action of central forces (accelerations) which increase with decreasing distance from the center. An iterative computational method to evaluate orbits for central forces is described, which is based onNewton's mathematical development of the concept of curvature started in 1664. This method accounts very well for the orbit obtained byNewton for a constant central force, and it gives convergent results even for forces which diverge at the center, which are discussed correctly inNewton's letterwithout usingKepler's law of areas.Newton found the relation of this law to general central forces only after his correspondence withHooke. The curvature method leads to an equation of motion whichNewton could have solvedanalytically to find that motion on a conic section with a radial force directed towards a focus implies an inverse square force, and that motion on a logarithmic spiral implies an inverse cube force.     

The material theory of induction and the epistemology of thought experiments

John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The argument view of thought experiments claims that thought experiments are arguments, and that they function epistemically however arguments do. These two views have generated a great deal of discussion, although there hasn't been much written about their combination. I argue that despite some interesting harmonies, there is a serious tension between them. I consider several options for easing this tension, before suggesting a set of changes to the argument view that I take to be consistent with Norton's fundamental philosophical commitments, and which retain what seems intuitively correct about the argument view. These changes require that we move away from a unitary epistemology of thought experiments and towards a more pluralist position.     

Instrumental causes and the natural origin of souls in Antonio Ponce Santacruz's theory of animal generation

This article studies the theory of animal seeds as purely material entities in the early seventeenth-century medical writings of Antonio Ponce Santacruz, royal physician to the Spanish king Philipp IV. Santacruz adopts the theory of the eduction of substantial forms from the potentiality of matter, according to which new kinds of causal powers can arise out of material composites of a certain complexity. Santacruz stands out among the late Aristotelian defenders of eduction theory because he applies the concept of an instrument of direction developed by the medieval Avicenna commentator Gentile da Foligno and gives a novel turn to this concept by interpreting animal seeds as separate instruments. The article situates Santacruz's theory in the context of early modern debates about the concept of the eduction of forms, as well as in the context of early modern debates about the concept of separate instruments. Particular attention is paid to Santacruz's responses to the biological views of Julius Caesar Scaliger and Thomas Feyens. Santacruz's response to Scaliger turns out to be central for his explication of the eduction relation, and Santacruz's response to Feyens turns out to be central for his explication of the nature of instrumental causation.