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对功能主义心身理论的反思
引用本文:戴振宇.对功能主义心身理论的反思[J].孝感学院学报,2002,22(2):17-21.
作者姓名:戴振宇
作者单位:华中师范大学,政法学院,湖北,武汉,430079
摘    要:作为西方心灵哲学主流思想的功能主义,其理论得到了多数人的支持和赞同,但也有哲学家对其提出了严峻的挑战,哲字冢塞尔的“中文屋论证”思想实验更被称为对功能主义的颠覆性论证。文章通过对功能主义及其引起的相关争论的批判性反思,认为在关于心的本体论问题上不应过于极端化。在心身随附理论的前提下,我们可以既肯定功能主义的理论意义,又避免其对感受性问题的忽视,从而使心身问题得到较合理的解释。

关 键 词:功能主义  感受性  “中文屋论证”
文章编号:1671-2544(2002)02-0017-05

The Introspection of the Functionalism's Mind-body Theory
DAI Zhen-yu.The Introspection of the Functionalism's Mind-body Theory[J].JOURNAL OF XIAOGAN UNIVERSITY,2002,22(2):17-21.
Authors:DAI Zhen-yu
Abstract:The functionalism was the mainstream of the philosophy of mind,which was the focus of world attention.Its theory enlists popular support and agreement.At the same time,many philosophyers also seriously challenged to its theory.The Searle's "Chinese Room Argument" mind parable has been regarded as the funtionalism's subversionary argument.The paper critically inspects the functionalism and the argument about it,we deem it should not excessively extreme at the ontological problem of mind.Basing on the premise of supervenience theory,we not only can affirm the achievements of functionalism,but also can avoid the absent of qualia problem.Thereby,we will more reasonable account for mind body problem.
Keywords:functionalism  qualia  "Chinese Room Argument  
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