| 配股权对询价效率影响的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 詹欣,叶可,陈伟忠.配股权对询价效率影响的博弈分析[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2009,37(6). |
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| 作者姓名： | 詹欣 叶可 陈伟忠 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 同济大学,经济与管理学院,上海,200092
2. 国泰君安证券企业融资总部,上海,200120 |
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| 摘 要： | 对拥有配股权的承销商和两种极端报价的询价对象在询价过程中的行为进行分析,进而建立起一个动态的博弈模型.基于该模型,寻求配股权影响程度,抑价率水平目标和询价区间之间的均衡关系.博弈及数理分析表明,通过赋予承销商相应的"配股权"剔除在询价过程中询价对象的极端报价,可以达到特定的抑价率水平,从而提高询价效率.
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| 关 键 词： | 配股权 询价效率 抑价率水平 |
Game Analysis of Effect of Shares Allocation Right on Inquiry Efficiency |
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| ZHAN Xin,YE Ke and CHEN Weizhong.Game Analysis of Effect of Shares Allocation Right on Inquiry Efficiency[J].Journal of Tongji University(Natural Science),2009,37(6). |
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| Authors: | ZHAN Xin YE Ke and CHEN Weizhong |
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| Institution: | School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China;GUOTAI JUNAN Securities,Corporate Finance Head Office,Shanghai 200120,China;School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China |
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| Abstract: | Based on analysis of the behavior of the underwriter who has the right of allocation and the two kinds of inquirers who will give exceeding price,a dynamic state model is established.The model,is used to identify the equilibrium relationship among the influence of the right of allocation,the aim of underpricing level and the inquiry interval.The game and mathematical analysis of this model indicates that the exceeding price can be averted by giving the right of allocation to the underwriter,the aim of underpricing level achieved and the efficiency of inquiry realized. |
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| Keywords: | right of allocating shares efficiency of inquiry underpricing level |
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