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供应链价值网络合作博弈核心解的非空性
引用本文:杨文博,高政利.供应链价值网络合作博弈核心解的非空性[J].系统工程,2009(11).
作者姓名:杨文博  高政利
作者单位:西北工业大学理学院;西北工业大学管理学院;湖南商学院;
摘    要:从供应链价值网络稳定性角度,通过建立供应链价值网络合作博弈模型,得到合作博弈核心解的存在是供应链价值网络持续稳定运行的关键,其供应链价值网络合作博弈核心解非空取决于路径否决参与人集合是否非空,而产品市场需求量以及产品销售价格是影响核心解是否非空的重要因素。只有当核心非空时,供应链各参与方将确保能得到合理的利润分配,供应链价值网络才能持续稳定运行。

关 键 词:供应链价值网络  合作博弈  核心非空性  

Non-empty Property of the Core in Cooperative Games of the Supply Chain Value Network
YANG Wen-bo,GAO Zheng-li.Non-empty Property of the Core in Cooperative Games of the Supply Chain Value Network[J].Systems Engineering,2009(11).
Authors:YANG Wen-bo  GAO Zheng-li
Institution:YANG Wen-bo1,GAO Zheng-li2,3(1.School of Science,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi'an 710129,China,2.School of Management,3.Hunan Business Colleges,Changsha 410205,China)
Abstract:From the view of the stability of the supply chain value network,this paper established the cooperative game model of the supply chain value network.It finds that the core of the game is the key element of the network sustained and stable operation.Furthermore,it studied that the core of the game depends on the set of the reject participation on paths,the size of market demand,as well as the sales prices.Only when the core of the cooperative game is non-empty will the players of the supply chain value netwo...
Keywords:Supply Chain Value Network  Cooperative Games  Non-empty Property of the Core  
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