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试析国有资产营运机构和政府的委托-代理关系
引用本文:费章凤. 试析国有资产营运机构和政府的委托-代理关系[J]. 东华大学学报(自然科学版), 2006, 32(4): 29-33
作者姓名:费章凤
作者单位:东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海,200051
摘    要:国有资产营运机构和政府的关系是构建国资营运机构治理模式的基础。本文通过委托-代理模型剖析国有资产营运机构与政府之间的关系。基本委托-代理模型,结合国有资产营运机构的特点,引入概率约束参数来反映国有资产运营机构参与国有资产经营管理的约束条件,得出国资营运机构的努力成本系数是影响营运绩效的重要因素,政府应通过有效的激励与约束机制降低国有资产运营中的努力成本系数,完善与营运机构之间的委托-代理关系,实现双方利益的最优化。

关 键 词:国有资产营运机构  政府  委托-代理理论
修稿时间:2005-09-29

Principal-Agent Model Between the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations and the Government
FEI Zhang-feng. Principal-Agent Model Between the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations and the Government[J]. Journal of Donghua University, 2006, 32(4): 29-33
Authors:FEI Zhang-feng
Abstract:The relationship between the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations and the Government is essential for establishing the governance model of the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations.Based on the principal-agent model and combined with the characteristics of the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations,the paper utilizes the probability constraint parameters to reflect the constraint conditions for the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations' participation in managing the state-owned assets.The paper points out that the effort cost coefficient is the critical factor that influences the operational excellence of the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations.As the principal,the Government shall try to improve its principal-agent relationship with the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations and optimize mutual benefits through effective incentive and control mechanism.
Keywords:state-owned assets operating organization  government  principal-agent theory
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