| 简介动态合约理论及其在CEO薪酬设计中的应用 |
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| 引用本文： | 王城.简介动态合约理论及其在CEO薪酬设计中的应用[J].复旦学报(自然科学版),2003,42(5):655-663. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王城 |
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| 作者单位： | IoWa州立大学 |
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| 摘 要： | 许多经济关系与经济结构都以一个长期并且动态的合约为基础．动态合约理论在经济学及管理学的相关领域里应用广泛．在此，简略地介绍三个动态合约模型，并对它们在CEO薪酬方面的应用作直接的推演,这篇短文的另一个目的是为感兴趣的读者介绍动态合约理论的一些基本研究手段.
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| 关 键 词： | 动态合约 激励 CEO薪酬 |
An Introduction to the Theory of Dynamic Contract and Its Applications to CEO Compensation |
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| Abstract.An Introduction to the Theory of Dynamic Contract and Its Applications to CEO Compensation[J].Journal of Fudan University(Natural Science),2003,42(5):655-663. |
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| Authors: | Abstract |
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| Abstract: | Many economic institutions are based on a long-term contract. Dynamic contract theory is a useful tool for analyzing a variety of economic issues. This essay reviews three formal models of dynamic contracts in the context of CEO compensation. These models show that dynamic contract theory has interesting implications for understanding the observed CEO compensation dynamics and for the optimal design of CEO incentive contracts. |
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| Keywords: | dynamic contracts incentives CEO compensation |
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