| 削减量信息不完全条件下双寡头厂商治污技术投资决策 |
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| 引用本文： | 孙卫,刘民婷,梁玑华,李寿德.削减量信息不完全条件下双寡头厂商治污技术投资决策[J].系统管理学报,2012,21(1):83-86. |
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| 作者姓名： | 孙卫 刘民婷 梁玑华 李寿德 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西安交通大学管理学院,西安,710049
2. 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70873084) |
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| 摘 要： | 基于赢者通吃和信息不完全的假设,建立了削减量信息不完全下,双寡头厂商治污技术投资期权博弈模型,并进行了数值模拟。研究表明,厂商的博弈均衡存在且唯一,对称厂商的均衡结果为同时均衡;不对称厂商的均衡结果可能为序贯均衡、抢先均衡或同时均衡。
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| 关 键 词： | 治污技术投资 信息不完全 削减量 期权博弈 |
Investment Decision of Pollution Abatement Technology for Symmetric Duopoly with Incomplete Information on Pollution Discharge Reduction |
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| SUN Wei
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LIU Min-ting
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LIANG Ji-hua
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LI Shou-de.Investment Decision of Pollution Abatement Technology for Symmetric Duopoly with Incomplete Information on Pollution Discharge Reduction[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2012,21(1):83-86. |
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| Authors: | SUN Wei LIU Min-ting LIANG Ji-hua LI Shou-de |
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| Institution: | 1.School of Management,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an 710049,China;2.Antai College of Economics & Management,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai 200052,China) |
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| Abstract: | Under the assumptions of winner-takes-all and incomplete information,the option game model of pollution abatement technology investment for Symmetric duopoly with incomplete of pollution discharge reduction is constructed and numerically studied.The results show that there exists a unique equilibrium in the game.The equilibrium of symmetric duopoly is a collusive equilibrium,while the equilibrium of asymmetric duopoly may be preemption,sequential or collusive equilibrium. |
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| Keywords: | pollution abatement technology investment incomplete information pollution discharge reduction option game |
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