差异化垄断竞争产业中的信息披露博弈

为研究具有众多企业的Bertrand垄断竞争市场中的生产信息披露行为,使用可观察行动的两阶段贝叶斯博弈模型化了n个风险中性企业是否有激励向行业协会披露各自的私有信息的问题.结果表明:在给定的信息结构下,隐瞒成本信息是唯一的子博弈完美纯策略纳什均衡;而且企业的均衡期望收益是其私有信息预测质量的增函数.这一结果不但将双寡头市场下的相关结论拓展到了任意市场结构的信息披露均衡,而且解释了生产信息的预测精度作用于企业期望收益的内在机制.

Information Disclosure Game in Differentiated Oligopolistic Industries

This paper studied the incentives for information sharing among firms in a Bertrand oligopoly facing a linear uncertain cost.No information sharing is found to be the unique subgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a given information structure.Furthermore,the expected equilibrium payoff of each firm increases with precise of his private information.The conclusion not only extends the special result derived from the duopoly to the general market structure,but also explains the reason why forecast information has the positive effect on the expected profit of the firms.