| 事后道德风险下的保险合同模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 李朗,文斌,黄小虎. 事后道德风险下的保险合同模型[J]. 五邑大学学报(自然科学版), 2008, 22(3): 36-40 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李朗 文斌 黄小虎 |
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| 作者单位： | 华南农业大学理学院,广东,广州,510642 |
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| 摘 要： | 以博彝论为基础，建立了事后道德风险下的保险合同模型，给出了模型的最优解，分析了投保人的损失对投保人最终财富的边际效用以及赔偿额的影响，并得出了一系列结论
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| 关 键 词： | 博彝论 事后道德风险 赔偿金 保险合同模型 |
An Insurance Contract Model under the Ex Post Moral Hazard |
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| LI Lang,WEN Bin,HUANG Xiao-hu. An Insurance Contract Model under the Ex Post Moral Hazard[J]. Journal of Wuyi University(Natural Science Edition), 2008, 22(3): 36-40 |
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| Authors: | LI Lang WEN Bin HUANG Xiao-hu |
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| Affiliation: | (College of Science, South China Agricuhure University, Guangzhou 510642, China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on the game theory, the paper constructs an insurance contract model under the ex post moral hazard and gets the optimal solution, discusses the impact of the insured＇s loss to the insured＇s expected marginal utility with respect to final wealth and the compensation, and derives a series of conclusions |
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| Keywords: | game theory ex post moral hazard compensation insurance contract model |
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