Auction Mechanism Design in Wholesale Electricity Market Considering Impacts of Long-term Contract |
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| Institution: | 1. College of Economics and Management, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing, 400047, China;2. College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, 400030, China;1. Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Copenhagen, Universitetsparken 5, 2100 København Ø, Denmark;2. System Analysis, Technical University of Denmark, Frederiksborgvej 399, 4000 Roskilde, Denmark;3. Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Høgskoleringen 1, 7491 Trondheim, Norway;1. Department of Civil Engineering, University of Toronto, 35 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A4, Canada;2. Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Toronto, 100 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3, Canada;1. Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, 2225 Speedway, Austin, TX, 78712, USA;2. MISO, 2985 Ames Crossing Road, Eagan, MN, 55121, USA;3. Department of Asian and Policy Studies, Education University of Hong Kong, 10 Lo Ping Road, Tai Po, New Territories, Hong Kong;1. School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China;2. Guangdong Laboratory of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Economy (SZ), Shenzhen, China;3. School of Computing, Macquarie University, Australia;4. School of Computer Science, University of Windsor, Windsor, Canada;1. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Islamic University of Technology (IUT), Bangladesh;2. Department of Civil, Environmental, and Construction Engineering, University of Central Florida, USA;3. School of Architecture, Building and Civil Engineering, Loughborough University, Ashby Road, Loughborough, Leicestershire, LE113TU, UK;4. Urban Design and Built Environment Graduate Major, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan;5. Department of Civil Engineering, IUBAT-International University of Business Agriculture and Technology, Bangladesh |
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| Abstract: | In wholesale electricity market, a generator with cost information advantage will submit a bid higher than its true cost, which may reduce the market efficiency. To solve this problem, this article designs an incentive auction mechanism considering the impacts of long-term contract and the variability of marginal cost. The new mechanism includes an extra payment (information compensation) that will make generators submit their true marginal cost, and thus, achieves distribution efficiency. Then, it makes a demonstration based on the data from IEEE-RTS96. The result shows that the new mechanism can control the market power of generator and avoid strategic bidding behaviors. |
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