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Evolutionary Game Model between Governments and Core Enterprises in Greening Supply Chains
Institution:1. School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, PR China;2. Jiangsu Energy Economy and Management Research Base, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, PR China
Abstract:In order to investigate the games between governments and core enterprises in greening supply chains, this article analyzes their respective costs and benefits, and studies the evolutionary game model. Game analysis shows that core-enterprises' costs and benefits to implement green supply chain management as well as subsidies and penalties from governments directly affect the game results; there are three evolutionary stable strategies in three cases. To gain long-term benefits, governments should enact and enforce increasingly strict environmental regulations, and increase relevant subsidies and penalties; core enterprises need to proactively implement environment management, and gain environmental experience, and then further affect upstream and downstream enterprises. That is the way to realize the win-win strategy between governments and core enterprises in the long run.
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