基子MA和多卖方主从对策的转移定价

运用Stackelberg主从对策思想中提出的定产量决策方法,首先,对包括3个参与方(单供应商和两个分销商)的供应链在不同的合作方分别居于主方地位假设下的转移定价决策进行了研究;然后,将分销商数目从两个扩展到n个,对一般性供应链合作进行了初步探讨。研究过程中,以供应商制定初始转移价格为出发点,假设保持独立的两个分销商同时接受、同时拒绝;一方接受、一方拒绝这个初始价格,从而形成3种主从对策博弈,针对各个参与方在每种博弈下的反应及其在转移定价决策中的地位,分别探讨其利润最大化的实现前提,从而得出了与博弈均衡相适应的最优转移定价决策的思路;并将不同的博弈均衡下各参与方的利润与供应商不通过分销商直接进入最终产品市场的单节点供应链利润进行对比分析,初步探讨了当前供应链合作对供应商总利润的影响。

The Transfer Pricing Based on MA and Stackelberg Game with Multiple Retailers

This article did a research on transfer pricing policies for a two-node supply chain consisting of single supplier and two retailers by applying for the opinion suggested by Stackelberg.By setting different original transfer prices,the supplier can induce different partners in a leadership position,and thus others in a following position,and which form variable Stackelberg games.And then,by a comparison research,it suggested appropriate pricing policies according to different Stackelberg game equilibriums.