| Pay-based Screening Mechanism: Personnel Selection in the View of Economics Theory |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘帮成 唐宁玉 |
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| 作者单位： | Aetna School of Management，Shanghai Jiaotong University，Shanghai 200030，Aetna School of Management，Shanghai Jiaotong University，Shanghai 200030 |
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| 摘 要： | Based on economic theories, the paper studies the personnel selection at the asymmetric job market using signaling and screening model. The authors hold the opinion that an organization can screen the candidates' signaling based on the self-selection principle by providing an appropriate compensation choice. A pay-based screening mechanism is proposed to help the organization drive away the nonqualified applicants and retain the excellent applicants.
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Pay-based Screening Mechanism: Personnel Selection in the View of Economics Theory |
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| LIU Bang-cheng TANG Ning-yu
Aetna School of Management,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai.Pay-based Screening Mechanism: Personnel Selection in the View of Economics Theory[J].Journal of Donghua University,2003,20(4). |
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| Authors: | LIU Bang-cheng TANG Ning-yu
Aetna School of Management Shanghai Jiaotong University Shanghai |
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| Institution: | Aetna School of Management,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai 200030 |
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| Abstract: | Based on economic theories, the paper studies the personnel selection at the asymmetric job market using signaling and screening model. The authors hold the opinion that an organization can screen the candidates' signaling based on the self-selection principle by providing an appropriate compensation choice. A pay-based screening mechanism is proposed to help the organization drive away the nonqualified applicants and retain the excellent applicants. |
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| Keywords: | signaling signaling distortion pay-based screening mechanism self-selection |
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