平台动态防御演化博弈模型和状态迁移策略

为提升平台动态防御系统对病毒的适应性和防御效能,对基于有限理性假设的平台动态防御演化博弈模型和状态迁移策略进行研究。首先,从病毒传播感染机理入手,阐述了平台状态迁移动态防御和有限理性假设下的演化博弈原理,分析了平台动态防御中节点状态转移关系和影响因素;其次,定义了平台动态防御的演化博弈模型和关键参数,考虑迁移平台与病毒类型之间的免疫特性,提出免疫因子和防御节点收益计算方法;最后,通过算例给出了单个状态演化稳定分析流程和方法,设计了节点状态迁移演化均衡策略生成算法。理论分析和仿真结果表明:平台动态防御节点状态迁移演化均衡策略具有更好的防御效能,可有效解决平台动态防御系统在面对随机攻击病毒的平台迁移选择问题。

Platform Dynamic Defense Evolution Game Model and State Migration Strategy

In order to improve the adaptability and defense effectiveness of the platform dynamic defense system to virus, a platform dynamic defense evolution game model and state migration strategy based on the finite rational hypothesis are studied. First, the mechanism of virus transmission and infection is elaborated, and the state migration relationship in the platform dynamic defense is provided. Secondly, the PDD evolutionary game model is established, and immune factors are introduced in the income calculation while the immune characteristics between the migrating platform and the virus type are considered. At last, the flow chart and method of single state evolutionary stability strategy analysis are given in demo, and a novel node state migration strategy are presented as well as the corresponding algorithm. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that the node state migration evolutionary equilibrium strategy of platform dynamic defense has better efficiency, and can effectively solve the platform migration selection problem of platform dynamic defense system in the case of random attack viruses.