基于企业成长函数的激励机制

在现代企业组织实践中，激励方案的发展呈现多样化和长期的特点，对此，传统的委托－代理模型无法做出合理的解释，本文分析了现代企业系统的复杂性和目标的多样性，提出企业作为一个有机的系统，单纯追求利润最大化的不合理性，并且建立了基于企业成长函数的委托－代理模型，模型的目标函数包括短期利润和长期利用两部分，妥该模型证明了采用长期合同的解帕累托优于采用单期合同的解，从而为现代企业新的多样化的激励机制提供了理论依据。

Incentive Mechanism Based on Enterprise’s Growth Function

The development of incentive scheme has the characteristic of diverse and long term in present management of organizations. The traditional principal agency model can't provide reasonable answer. This paper studies the complexity and diversity of modern enterprises, points out that it is irrational for an enterprise to pursue short term profit merely, and provides a principal agency model based on the enterprise's growth function. The objective function of the model includes two parts, short term profit and long term profit. It is proved that the solution with long term contracts is Pareto and is superior to the solution with short term contracts.