| COMPETITIVE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES IN ADOPTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY WITH A FURTHER NEW TECHNOLOGY ANTICIPATED |
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| 作者姓名： | Xianghua LIU Chulin LI |
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| 作者单位： | Xianghua LIU Chulin LI
Department of Mathematics Huazhong University of Science and Technology，Wuhan 43007 4，P.R. China |
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| 基金项目： | the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 70071012 |
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| 摘 要： | In dynamic uncertain environments, the investment timing of the firm about adopting the existing new technology is influenced by the rival's actions and technological progress. This paper employs option games approach to present a simplified duopoly continuous time model of technology adoption. In the model, the irreversible investment in adoption of the existing new technology is in strategic competitive circumstances and facing the threat of a further new technology after the competition setting is established. The purpose of the paper is to examine the effect of technological displacement on firms' strategic investment. The results show that rapid displacement of the technology encourages the leader's investment and discourages the follower's investment. Comparing with the optimal timing without the expectation of a further new technology, the firm hastens to invest when no firm has invested; however, once one firm has invested first, the firm will delay its investment. Using mixed strategy analysis,
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| 关 键 词： | 竞争投资 移位效应 投资风险 风险控制 不确定性 |
Competitive investment strategies in adoption of new technology with a further new technology anticipated |
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| Xianghua LIU Chulin LI.COMPETITIVE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES IN ADOPTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY WITH A FURTHER NEW TECHNOLOGY ANTICIPATED[J].Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering,2003,12(4):493-502. |
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| Authors: | Xianghua Liu Chulin Li |
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| Institution: | Department of Mathematics Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074,P.R. China |
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| Abstract: | In dynamic uncertain environments, the investment timing of the firm about adopting the existing new technology is influenced by the rival's actions and technological progress. This paper employs option games approach to present a simplified duopoly continuous time model of technology adoption. In the model, the irreversible investment in adoption of the existing new technology is in strategic competitive circumstances and facing the threat of a further new technology after the competition setting is established. The purpose of the paper is to examine the effect of technological displacement on firms' strategic investment. The results show that rapid displacement of the technology encourages the leader's investment and discourages the follower's investment. Comparing with the optimal timing without the expectation of a further new technology, the firm hastens to invest when no firm has invested; however, once one firm has invested first, the firm will delay its investment. Using mixed strategy analysis, competitive investment strategies with sequential exercise and simultaneous exercise are derived. |
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| Keywords: | Option games technology adoption displacement effect |
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