| STRATEGIC EXERCISE OF REAL OPTIONS：INVESTMENT DECISIONS IN TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS |
| |
| 作者姓名： | Kevin ZHU John WEYANT |
| |
| 作者单位： | Graduate School of Management University of California，Irvine，CA 92697-3125，USA，Graduate School of Management University of California，Irvine，CA 92697-3125，USA |
| |
| 摘 要： | Viewing investment projects in new technologies as real options, this paper studies the effects ofendogenous competition and asymmetric information on the strategic exercise of real options. We firstdevelop a multi-period, game-theoretic model and show how competition leads to early exercise andaggressive investment behaviors and how competition erodes option values. We then relax the typicalfull-information assumption found in the literature and allow information asymmetry to exist acrossfirms. Our model shows, in contrast to the literature that payoff is independent of the ordering ofexercise, that the sequential exercise of real options may generate both informational and payoffexternalities. We also find some surpising but interesting results such as having more information isnot necessarily better.
|
| 关 键 词： | 科技系统 技术革新 投资决策 实项 博弈论 动态博弈 不完全信息 |
Strategic exercise of real options: Investment decisions in technological systems |
| |
| Kevin ZHU,John WEYANT.Strategic exercise of real options: Investment decisions in technological systems[J].Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering,2003,12(3):257-278. |
| |
| Authors: | Kevin Zhu John Weyant |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Graduate School of Management University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-3125, USA kzhu@uci. edu
2. Department of Management Science and Engineering Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-4026, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | Viewing investment projects in new technologies as real options, this paper studies the effects of endogenous competition and asymmetric information on the strategic exercise of real options. We first develop a multi-period, game-theoretic model and show how competition leads to early exercise and aggressive investment behaviors and how competition erodes option values. We then relax the typical full-information assumption found in the literature and allow information asymmetry to exist across firms. Our model shows, in contrast to the literature that payoff is independent of the ordering of exercise, that the sequential exercise of real options may generate both informational and payoff externalities. We also find some surprising but interesting results such as having more information is not necessarily better. |
| |
| Keywords: | Technology investment competition real options game theory dynamic games incomplete information technological systems and technology innovation |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
