Styles for philosophers of science |
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| Institution: | 1. IAS-Research Center for Life, Mind and Society, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country (EHU/UPV), Avenida de Tolosa 70, 20018 Donostia-San Sebastián, Spain;2. Laboratorio de Neurobiologia y Biologia del Conocer (Biology of Cognition Lab), Facultad de Ciencia, Universidad de Chile, Las Encinas 3370, Ñuñoa, Santiago, Chile;1. Information Sciences Directorate, US Army Research Office, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709, United States;2. Department of Physics, Duke University, Durham, NC 25501, United States;1. The Niels Bohr Institute, Copenhagen University, Blegdamsvej 17, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark;2. IMAPP, Radboud University, Heyendaalseweg 135, 6525 AJ, Nijmegen, The Netherlands;3. Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics, B. Cheremushkinskaya 25, 117218 Moscow, Russia;1. Department of Computer Science, Loughborough University, UK;2. Department of Computer Science, Kiel University, Germany;1. Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, Newark, United States;2. Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, United States |
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| Abstract: | In this paper I discuss the bearing of Hacking’s ideas about Scientific Styles on traditional debates in the philosophy of science concerning rationality and realism. I argue that a kind of deflationary position with regard to realism debates is a natural consequence of Hacking’s claim that styles are self-authenticating. I then go on to argue, using an example of van Fraassen’s, that Hacking should allow a methodological role for realism debates and hence they are not idle, as he has claimed, although their resolution may not be important. |
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