Styles of reasoning: A pluralist view |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Orthopedic Surgery, Orthopedic Oncology Service, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, United States;2. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Harvard Medical School, United States;1. PPL, Université Grenoble Alpes, CS 40700, 38058, Grenoble Cedex, France;2. IRPHIL, Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3, 18 rue Chevreul, 69007, Lyon, France;1. Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA;2. National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA, Woods Hole, MA 02543, USA;3. National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA, Santa Cruz, CA 95060, USA |
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Abstract: | Styles of reasoning are important devices to understand scientific practice. As I use the concept, a style of reasoning is a pattern of inferential relations that are used to select, interpret, and support evidence for scientific results. In this paper, I defend the view that there is a plurality of styles of reasoning: different domains of science often invoke different styles. I argue that this plurality is an important source of disunity in scientific practice, and it provides additional arguments in support of the disunity claim. I also contrast Ian Hacking’s broad characterization of styles of reasoning with a narrow understanding that I favor. Drawing on examples from molecular biology, chemistry and mathematics, I argue that differences in style of reasoning lead to differences in the way the relevant results are obtained and interpreted. The result is a pluralist view about styles of reasoning that is sensitive to nuances of inferential relations in scientific activity. |
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