不对称信息下差异化补贴对新能源汽车供应链影响研究

目的 研究一个制造商和一个加盟店组成的新能源汽车供应链，考虑制造商成本信息不对称时，政府差异化补贴对新能源汽车供应链的影响问题。方法 运用博弈理论建立制造商和加盟店之间的委托代理模型，设计加盟店销售契约，采用运筹学非线性优化方法对模型进行求解，分析不对称信息和政府补贴对供应链参与者的影响、政府补贴对信息价值的叠加影响，并给出了数值算例。结果 差异化补贴总能激励制造商提高产品绿色度水平与绿色生产效率，实现加盟店利润增长；信息不对称会导致加盟店的利润损失，只有当生产效率较高时，制造商才能从不对称信息中获得信息租金；低成本类型制造商始终只能获得保留利润。无论效率高与低，补贴总会进一步加剧加盟店的信息劣势；制造商生产效率较高时，供应链内部利润实现转移而整体效益不会受损，进而规避不对称信息带来的不利影响。补贴会进一步加大不对称信息对供应链的影响，而且会随着制造商绿色生产效率的高低发生变化。结论 差异化补贴能激励加盟店与绿色生产效率高的汽车制造商合作，进而推动新能源汽车产业可持续发展与转型升级；不对称信息对制造商及加盟店的收益会产生影响，补贴不仅能扩大高效率制造商的信息优势，而且对信息价值具有叠加...

Research on the Impacts of Differential Subsidies on New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

Objective This paper studies the supply chain of new energy vehicles composed of a manufacturer and a franchised store and considers the impact of differentiated government subsidies on the supply chain of new energy vehicles when the manufacturer?? s cost information is asymmetric. Methods A principal-agent model between the manufacturer and the franchisee was established using game theory a franchise sales contract was designed and the model was solved using a non-linear optimization method in operations research. The effects of asymmetric information and government subsidies on supply chain participants and the superimposed effects of government subsidies on the value of information were analyzed and numerical examples were given. Results Differential subsidies always provide incentives for manufacturers to improve the greenness of their products and green production efficiency resulting in increased profits for the franchise. Information asymmetry will lead to the profit loss of the franchise. Only when the production efficiency is high can manufacturers obtain information rents from asymmetric information. Low-cost type manufacturers will always only gain retained profits. Regardless of efficiency subsidies always further exacerbate the information disadvantage of the franchise. When the manufacturer?? s production efficiency is high the profit within the supply chain can be transferred without damaging the overall benefits thus avoiding the adverse effects brought by asymmetric information. Subsidies will further increase the impact of asymmetric information on the supply chain and will vary with the level of green production efficiency of manufacturers. Conclusion Differentiated subsidies can inspire franchises to work with green and productive vehicle manufacturers thereby promoting sustainable development and transformation and upgrading of the new energy vehicle industry. Asymmetric information has an impact on the returns of manufacturers and franchises. Subsidies can expand the information advantage of the efficient manufacturer and have a superimposed effect on information value.