| “锦标赛”激励机制与团队成员的合谋博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 敬辉蓉. “锦标赛”激励机制与团队成员的合谋博弈分析[J]. 西南民族学院学报(自然科学版), 2009, 35(4): 693-697 |
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| 作者姓名： | 敬辉蓉 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆师范大学重庆市运筹与控制重点实验室,重庆,400047 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过建立锦标赛制排序工资激励的博弈模型发现在团队成员间无合谋行为的情况下，基于业绩的排序工资激励机制能实现激励相容的激励目标．而在团队成员的行为不能有效监督的情况下，代理人之间就有动机合谋，通过合谋博弈模型分析了合谋双方的行为策略及对激励机制的扭曲，在此情况下给出了一个委托人应对合谋的再谈判协议，再谈判使委托人可以得到激励合同的次优解．
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| 关 键 词： | 排序工资 激励 合谋 再谈判 |
The game analysis of tournament incentive mechanism and the collusion between agents |
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| GOU Hui-rong. The game analysis of tournament incentive mechanism and the collusion between agents[J]. Journal of Southwest Nationalities College(Natural Science Edition), 2009, 35(4): 693-697 |
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| Authors: | GOU Hui-rong |
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| Affiliation: | GOU Hui-rong (The Key OR and Control Lab of Chongqing, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing 400047, P.R.C.) |
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| Abstract: | Through establishing the game model of tournament and the the collusion between the agents, it is discovered that the tournament incentive scheme based on performance could realize campatible incentive when there is no collusion between the agents. However, the collusion between the agents improve the payoff of agents, and damage the profits of principal. In this situation, the best strategy of principal is renegotiating with the one of the agents. Furthermore, re-negotiation could realize the second best solution of the contract. |
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| Keywords: | rank-order wage incentive collusion re-negotiation |
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