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| 无成本协同效应的横向兼并行为 | |
| 引用本文： | 张福利,达庆利,白宇欣. 无成本协同效应的横向兼并行为[J]. 系统管理学报, 2005, 14(2): 113-118 |
| 作者姓名： | 张福利 达庆利 白宇欣 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 东南大学,经济管理学院,南京,210096;南京审计学院,数学系,南京,210029 2. 东南大学,经济管理学院,南京,210096 3. 海军指挥学院,南京,211800 |
| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究"十五"规划课题基金资助项目(01JA630048) |
| 摘 要： | 基于寡头垄断竞争行业,研究了企业横向兼并的获利性和社会福利问题。结果表明:在企业兼并成垄断被排除的情况下,若兼并企业在其内部实施两阶段错开竞争且兼并企业与未参与兼并的企业之间进行Cournot竞争,则一次有利可图的先置兼并行为会引发系列兼并行为。当系列兼并行为发生后,兼并企业可能会陷入"囚徒困境",社会福利与初始的、完全分散的Cournot竞争市场相比可能增加。 |
| 关 键 词： | 横向兼并 兼并浪潮 成本协同效应 错开竞争 Cournot竞争 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-2542(2005)02-0113-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003-10-28 |
Analysis on Horizontal Merger Behaviors without Cost Synergy |
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| ZHANG Fu-li,DA Qing-li,BAI Yu-xin. Analysis on Horizontal Merger Behaviors without Cost Synergy[J]. Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications, 2005, 14(2): 113-118 | |
| Authors: | ZHANG Fu-li DA Qing-li BAI Yu-xin |
| Affiliation: | ZHANG Fu-li~ |
| Abstract: | The profitability and social welfare of horizontal mergers is studied based on the oligopoly market. As a result, if merging to monopoly is precluded by anti-trust concerns, and there is two-stage staggered competition within a merged firm and Cournot competition between the merged firm and unmerged firms, then a preemptive merger that is profitable can induce the occurrence of sequential horizontal mergers. Furthermore, those merged firms may be in the presence of a Prisoner's Dilemma after sequential mergers occur, but the welfare in such a situation may be greater than one where no firm is merged with Cournort competition. These conclusions provide a partial solution to the merger wave. |
| Keywords: | horizontal merger merger wave cost synergy staggered competition Cournot competition |
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