| 食品安全监察行为的进化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 幸丽娟,田双亮.食品安全监察行为的进化博弈分析[J].渝西学院学报(自然科学版),2011(1):13-16. |
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| 作者姓名： | 幸丽娟 田双亮 |
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| 作者单位： | 西北民族大学数学与计算机科学学院; |
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| 摘 要： | 运用进化博弈理论建立了食品监察部门与食品生产企业之间的非对称博弈模型,并且对建立的复制动态方程的局部稳定性进行了分析,得到了食品监察部门与食品生产企业决策行为的演化条件,在此基础上提出了关于食品安全的相关建议.
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| 关 键 词： | 食品安全 监管部门 进化博弈 |
Evolutionary game analysis of food safe supervision |
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| Authors: | XING Li-juan TIAN Shuang-liang |
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| Institution: | XING Li-juan,TIAN Shuang-liang(Mathematics and Computer Science College,Northwest University for Nationalities,Lanzhou Gansu 730030,China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on evolutionary game theory,the asymmetric game model of the supervisory departments and food production enterprise is established.The local stability of the replication dynamic equations is analyzed and obtains the evolutionary condition of the behavior selection in decision-making of the supervisory departments and food production enterprise,and some suggestions of food safety are given. |
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| Keywords: | food safety supervision department evolutionary game |
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