低值可回收物管理机制的演化博弈分析

我国再生资源利用率偏低,既加剧了垃圾围城趋势,又造成环境污染,理清低值可回收物治理中的各主体博弈关系有助于形成良好的长效机制。利用演化博弈理论,对政府、企业在低值可回收物处理中的演化过程进行了分析,并选用6组代表性数据通过Matlab软件进行仿真模拟。研究结果表明:当低值可回收物价值较高且回收成本较低时,回收企业有利可图,可回收物的资源化可以靠市场机制调节;随着低值可回收物资源化成本升高和资源化利用价值降低,单靠市场机制难以调动企业积极性,难以有效回收处理;政府可以通过建立低值可回收物动态目录,给予资源化企业补贴,并通过"两网协同"等措施降低企业收运成本,从而调动企业积极性,提高低值可回收物资源化利用率。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low Value Recyclable Management Mechanism

The utilization rate of renewable resources in our country is relatively low. In particular, low value recyclables such as waste glass, waste textiles and waste wrapping paper are largely abandoned which aggravates the trend of garbage siege and causes environmental pollution. Therefore, it is helpful to formulate a good long-term mechanism to sort out the game relationships among the main players in the management of low value recyclables. The evolutionary game theory was used to analyze the evolution of government and enterprises in the processing of low value recyclable materials. Six sets of representative data were selected to do a simulation with Matlab software. The results show that when low value recyclables are of higher worth and the recovery cost is lower, the recycling enterprises are profitable and the recycling of low value recyclables can be regulated by the market mechanism. With the increase of resource costs and the decrease of resource utilization value, it is difficult to mobilize the enthusiasm of low value recyclable enterprises solely on the basis of market mechanism, and it is difficult to recycle and dispose of them effectively. The government can reduce the enterprises'' collection and transportation costs through establishing a dynamic inventory of low value recyclables, subsidizing resource-oriented enterprises and taking measures such as "synergy between the two networks", thereby mobilizing the enthusiasm of enterprises and improving the utilization of low value recyclable resources.