| 企业并购决策的非合作博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 王祎望,李瑾. 企业并购决策的非合作博弈[J]. 东华大学学报(自然科学版), 2005, 31(5): 40-43 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王祎望 李瑾 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津市水利局,天津,300204 |
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| 摘 要： | 在经济全球化背景下,企业并购活动越发频繁,如以外资渗入中国化工行业为例.在企业并购活动中,科学合理的并购决策无疑是企业并购成功的关键.基于非合作博弈理论,建立了二阶段三人非合作博弈模型,对企业并购活动中的均衡、战略、报价以及期望收益进行了详尽的分析,为科学决策的做出提供理论指导.
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| 关 键 词： | 企业并购 非合作博弈 期望收益 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-04-29 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-04-29 |
Non-cooperative Game Analysis for the Decision of Enterprises Merger and Acquisition |
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| WANG Yi-wang,LI Jin. Non-cooperative Game Analysis for the Decision of Enterprises Merger and Acquisition[J]. Journal of Donghua University, 2005, 31(5): 40-43 |
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| Authors: | WANG Yi-wang LI Jin |
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| Affiliation: | Tianjin Water Conservancy Bureau, Tianjin, 300204 |
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| Abstract: | All these cases of foreign enterprises entering Chinese chemical industry indicate that merging and acquiring Chinese chemical process enterprises has become a hotspot for foreign investors. Based on the noncooperative game theory and the chemical process enterprises merger and acquisition, a two-stage-three-person noncooperative game model is proposed. The paper analyses equilibrium; strategies; offer and expected profits of the chemical process enterprise merger and acquisition with the aim to support decision-making, |
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| Keywords: | enterprise merger and acquisitior non-cooperative game expected profits |
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