首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

打车软件参与下出租车公司与司机行为博弈研究
引用本文:赵道致,吝云飞.打车软件参与下出租车公司与司机行为博弈研究[J].甘肃科学学报,2016(4):124-128.
作者姓名:赵道致  吝云飞
作者单位:天津大学 管理与经济学部,天津,300072
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71472134).
摘    要:近年来,随着移动互联网技术的快速发展,国内外以Uber、滴滴、快的等为代表的打车软件快速普及,对出租车市场造成了冲击,给使用者带来便利的同时也受到了一定的争议——打车软件作为一个平台,是否能在不破坏市场原则的条件下给使用方带来收益。研究使用委托代理理论,分析打车软件参与前后,出租车公司和出租车司机的收益情况变化。结果表明:在满足一定条件下,打车软件作为平台的参与,可以改善出租车公司、出租车司机和平台等多方收益。

关 键 词:打车软件  平台  博弈论  委托代理理论

Game Theory Study on Taxi Company and Driver'Behavior with the Participation of Taxi Taking Software
Abstract:In recent years,with the rapid development of mobile Internet technology,Uber,DIDI,Kuai Di as the representatives of the taxi taking software has been spread quickly at both home and abroad,which has brought great attacks on the taxi market.It also has caused many controversy with the convenience to the user - as a platform of taxi taking software,whether it can bring benefits to the consumer without breaking the market principle.This paper uses principal-agent theory to analysis the earnings changes of the taxi companies and drivers before and after the participation of taxi taking software.The results show that under certain conditions,the participation of taxi taking software as the platform can improve multi-bene-fits of the taxi companies,taxi drivers and platforms.
Keywords:Taxi taking software  Platform  Game theory  Principal-agent theory
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号