| 信息不对称时对激励机制的选择 |
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| 引用本文： | 祝足 黄培清. 信息不对称时对激励机制的选择[J]. 上海交通大学学报, 1997, 31(4): 23-26 |
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| 作者姓名： | 祝足 黄培清 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家教委人文社会科学研究项目,国务院发展研究所国际技术经济研究所上海分所博士导师专项基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 研究了在信息不对称条件下的激励机制，分析表明，此时影响激励机制的主要因素是风险和经理对风险的态度，有且只有经理是风险中性时，所有者可以通过出租企业得到最大的利润。否则所有者将蒙受一定的损失，并且这种损失随着风险以及经理对风险回避程度的增加而增加。最后，本文进一步提出了所有者可能采取的对策。
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| 关 键 词： | 激励机制 企业经营 经理负责制 不对称信息 |
Impact of the Risk and the Agent''''s Attitude Towards the Risk on Incentive Scheme |
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| Zhu Zu Huang Peiqing. Impact of the Risk and the Agent''''s Attitude Towards the Risk on Incentive Scheme[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 1997, 31(4): 23-26 |
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| Authors: | Zhu Zu Huang Peiqing |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management |
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| Abstract: | The optimal incentive scheme under information asymmetry is analyzed.The risk and the agent's attitude towards the risk are the two main factors that determine the mode of incentive scheme.The principal can get the maximum profit by leasing the firm,if and only if the agent is risk neutral.Otherwise the principal will incur a certain loss,and the loss increases as the risk and the agent's risk aversion increase.Some strategies the principal may adopt to improve his situation are further pointed out. |
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| Keywords: | incentive scheme information asymmetry risk |
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