风险投资中的逆向选择:分离均衡式契约安排

在VCs和创业家之间丰在着严重的逆向选择风险，为了消除这种逆向选择风险，VCs可以针对不同能力的创业家采用分离均衡式契约安排，从而吸引更多优秀的创业家，论文首先分析了风险投资过程中存在于VCs和创业家之间的逆向选择问题并讨论了不同能力的创业家分离均衡，证明在不同能力的创业家之间存在着唯一的分离均衡，然后建立了一个风险投资分离均衡式契约安排模型，最后以一个例子说明该模型的具体运用。

Study on adverse selection in venture capital:Separate balanced contract design

There is serious adverse selection between venture capitalist and entrepreneur. In order to eliminate this kind of adverse selection, venture capitalist can take separate balanced contract design in the light of the entrepreneurs of various ability to attract excellent entrepreneurs. This paper analyses adverse selection between venture capitalist and entrepreneur during venture capital and studies the separate balance of the entrepreneurs of various abilities at first, and testifies that there is unique separate balance among entrepreneurs with various abilities. Then this paper sets up a venture capital separate balanced contract design model. At last an example is given to illustrate the application of the model.