Conventionalism,structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s philosophy of science |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Humanities and Philosophy, University of Florence, Italy;2. Unit for HPS, University of Sydney, Australia;1. Department of Psychology, Temple University, Weiss Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19122, United States;2. Department of Anesthesiology and Critical Care, University of Pennsylvania, 423 Guardian Drive, 1121A Blockley Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6021, United States;3. Department of Anesthesiology and Critical Care, University of Pennsylvania, 3400 Spruce Street, Dulles 680, Philadelphia, PA 19104, United States;1. Department of Physics, Durham University, South Road, Durham DH1 3LE, UK;2. Department of Philosophy, Durham University, 50 Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HN, UK;1. Fachbereich Philosophie, Universität Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz, Germany;2. Institute for Theoretical Physics, Albert Einstein Center for Fundamental Physics, Universität Bern, Sidlerstrasse 5, 3012 Bern, Switzerland |
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| Abstract: | Poincaré is well known for his conventionalism and structuralism. However, the relationship between these two theses and their place in Poincaré׳s epistemology of science remain puzzling. In this paper I show the scope of Poincaré׳s conventionalism and its position in Poincaré׳s hierarchical approach to scientific theories. I argue that for Poincaré scientific knowledge is relational and made possible by synthetic a priori, empirical and conventional elements, which, however, are not chosen arbitrarily. By examining his geometric conventionalism, his hierarchical account of science and defence of continuity in theory change, I argue that Poincaré defends a complex structuralist position based on synthetic a priori and conventional elements, the mind-dependence of which precludes epistemic access to mind-independent structures. |
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| Keywords: | Conventionalism Henri Poincaré Neo-Kantianism Structural realism |
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