The role of symmetry in the interpretation of physical theories

The symmetries of a physical theory are often associated with two things: conservation laws (via e.g. Noether?s and Schur?s theorems) and representational redundancies (“gauge symmetry”). But how can a physical theory?s symmetries give rise to interesting (in the sense of non-trivial) conservation laws, if symmetries are transformations that correspond to no genuine physical difference? In this paper, I argue for a disambiguation in the notion of symmetry. The central distinction is between what I call “analytic” and “synthetic“ symmetries, so called because of an analogy with analytic and synthetic propositions. “Analytic“ symmetries are the turning of idle wheels in a theory?s formalism, and correspond to no physical change; “synthetic“ symmetries cover all the rest. I argue that analytic symmetries are distinguished because they act as fixed points or constraints in any interpretation of a theory, and as such are akin to Poincaré?s conventions or Reichenbach?s ‘axioms of co-ordination’, or ‘relativized constitutive a priori principles’.