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信息不对称下激励政策的制定--销售员道德风险程度的因素分析
引用本文:李晋宁,朱正萱,王惠霞,栾婕.信息不对称下激励政策的制定--销售员道德风险程度的因素分析[J].南京理工大学学报(自然科学版),2000,24(2).
作者姓名:李晋宁  朱正萱  王惠霞  栾婕
作者单位:南京理工大学经济管理学院,南京,210094
摘    要:阐述经理在制定销售员激励政策时存在的缺陷 ,通过运用信息不对称及贝克乐 -斯蒂格勒的委托 -代理模型对销售员从事道德风险行为进行分析 ,指出从事道德风险活动的动机与被发现的概率、额外收益 ,本份尽职时的工资收益、聘期 ,暴露其行为后的收益、及未来的收益贴现率的关系 ;提出对销售员进行激励的合理方法 ,为经理有效地制定激励政策提供了思路。

关 键 词:信息  不对称  激励  道德风险  委托-代理

Formulating Excitation Policy Based on Asymmetric Information--The Factors Analysis of Seller's Moral Hazard Level
LiJinning,ZhuZhengxuan,WangHuixia,LuanJie.Formulating Excitation Policy Based on Asymmetric Information--The Factors Analysis of Seller's Moral Hazard Level[J].Journal of Nanjing University of Science and Technology(Nature Science),2000,24(2).
Authors:LiJinning  ZhuZhengxuan  WangHuixia  LuanJie
Abstract:This paper expounded the imperfection when managers made the incentive plans for the sellers,applied the economy theory of asymmetric information and the principal agent to analyze the employee's moral hazard behavior,pointed out relationship between motive of moral hazard and reveal probability,extra probit and payment during employment and after being discused,and proposed the reasonable methods to incite the employees,which serves as basic approach for managers to make the effective incentive policy.
Keywords:information  asymmetry  excitation  moral hazard  principal agent  
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