Reduction and Understanding |
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Authors: | Dennis Dieks Henk W de Regt |
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Institution: | (1) Institute of the History and Foundations of Mathematics and, Science Utrecht University, P.O. Box 80.000, 3508 TA Utrecht, The Netherlands E-mail |
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Abstract: | Reductionism, in the sense of the doctrine that theories on different levels of reality should exhibit strict and general
relations of deducibility, faces well-known difficulties. Nevertheless, the idea that deeper layers of reality are responsible
for what happens at higher levels is well-entrenched in scientific practice. We argue that the intuition behind this idea
is adequately captured by the notion of supervenience: the physical state of the fundamental physical layers fixes the states
of the higher levels. Supervenience is weaker than traditional reductionism, but it is not a metaphysical doctrine: one can
empirically support the existence of a supervenience relation by exhibiting concrete relations between the levels. Much actual
scientific research is directed towards finding such inter-level relations. It seems to be quite generally held that the importance
of such relations between different levels is that they are explanatory and give understanding: deeper levels provide deeper
understanding, and this justifies the search for ever deeper levels. We shall argue, however, that although achieving understanding
is an important aim of science, its correct analysis is not in terms of relations between higher and lower levels. Connections
with deeper layers of reality do not generally provide for deeper understanding. Accordingly, the motivation for seeking deeper
levels of reality does not come from the desire to find deeper understanding of phenomena, but should be seen as a consequence
of the goal to formulate ever better, in the sense of more accurate and more-encompassing, empirical theories.
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. |
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