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论波普尔的科学进步理论——从比较学角度看波普尔对逻辑实证主义的继承和超越
引用本文:郭婉绯.论波普尔的科学进步理论——从比较学角度看波普尔对逻辑实证主义的继承和超越[J].芜湖职业技术学院学报,2008,10(1):23-25.
作者姓名:郭婉绯
作者单位:安徽师范大学政法学院,安徽芜湖,241000
摘    要:波普尔认为科学的精神应当是批判,科学是理性不断做出假说,而这种假说不断遭到批判,即被证伪。因此,波普尔提出科学与非科学的“划界标准”不是逻辑实证主义的“可证实性”原则,而应当是他的“可证伪性”原则。根据他的这一原则,波普尔表述了他的真理观,用逼真度取代“真理”作为对科学进步的量度。从证伪主义出发,波普尔最终建立了他的“猜想—反驳”方法论。

关 键 词:波普尔  科学进步理论  逻辑实证主义

On K.R. Popper's Theory of Scientific Progress
GUO Wan-fei.On K.R. Popper's Theory of Scientific Progress[J].Journal of Wuhu Vocational Institute of Technology,2008,10(1):23-25.
Authors:GUO Wan-fei
Institution:GUO Wan-fei
Abstract:K. R. Popper think that the spirit of science is criticism, and science is constantly-made rational hypothesis which is constantly criticized, that is to say, falsified. Hence, the line of demarcation between science and non-science posed by K. R. Popper is not "confirm" principle underlying logical positivism, but his "falsification" principle according to which, Popper expressed his views of truth that scientific progress should be measured by fidelity instead of truth. From his principle of falsification, Popper eventually establish his "guess-refuting" methodology.
Keywords:K  R  Popper  Theory of scientific progress  Logical Positivism
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