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序贯Stackelberg对策的激励机制
引用本文:金武 陈Ting.序贯Stackelberg对策的激励机制[J].上海交通大学学报,1996,30(2):153-158.
作者姓名:金武  陈Ting
作者单位:上海交通大学管理学院,华中理工大学
摘    要:研究不完全信息下的序贯Stackelberg对策问题中主方对从方的激励机制,给出了有记忆的反馈诱导策略的概念和序贯对策过程,分析了激励相容机制序列,探讨了序贯对策中激励机制约序列均衡问题.

关 键 词:序贯Stackelberg对策  不完全信息  激励相容机制  序列均衡  诱导策略

An Incentive Mechanism of Sequential Stackelberg Game
Jin Wu, Wang Huanchen.An Incentive Mechanism of Sequential Stackelberg Game[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,1996,30(2):153-158.
Authors:Jin Wu  Wang Huanchen
Institution:Jin Wu; Wang Huanchen (Institute of Management of Shanghai Jiaotong University)Chen Ting (Huazhong University of Science and Technology)
Abstract:The incentive mechanism from the leader to the follower in a sequential Stackelberg game with incomplete information is studied in this paper. The concept of feedback incentive strategy with memory and the process of the game are presented. The incentive mechanism sequence is analyzed. The sequential equilibrium problem of incentive mechanism in the sequential game is investigated.
Keywords:s: sequential Stackelberg game  incomplete information  incentive compatible mechanism  sequential equilibrium  incentive strategy
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