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发电商竞价策略的博弈分析
引用本文:张俊敏,侯志俭,袁智强,冯灏.发电商竞价策略的博弈分析[J].上海交通大学学报,2003,37(9):1384-1387.
作者姓名:张俊敏  侯志俭  袁智强  冯灏
作者单位:上海交通大学,电气工程系,上海200030
摘    要:采用经济学上的古诺模型,在考虑发电商向电力公司支付过网电量过网费的情况下,用完全信息静态博弈的方法,分析了发电商边际成本不变但互不相同和发电商边际成本变动两种情况下,发电商的最优发电量和最大利润等,并讨论了过网费费率对发电商制定最优策略的影响,算例结果表明了本文的推导和分析是正确的。

关 键 词:竞价策略  过网费  完全信息静态博弈  纳什均衡
文章编号:1006-2467(2003)09-1384-04
修稿时间:2002年9月28日

Study of Generation Companies' Bidding Strategies Using Game Theory
ZHANG Jun-min,HOU Zhi-jian,YUAN Zhi-qiang,FENG Hao.Study of Generation Companies'''' Bidding Strategies Using Game Theory[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2003,37(9):1384-1387.
Authors:ZHANG Jun-min  HOU Zhi-jian  YUAN Zhi-qiang  FENG Hao
Abstract:Cournot model, considering the wheeling cost, was introduced and the game theory of complete information was used. The generation companies are supposed with the different constant marginal costs and different alternate marginal costs. It analyzed the generation companies strategies such as the output and the profit. Also the relationship between the wheeling cost rate and the bidding strategy was discussed. The case study indicates the correctness of the analysis.
Keywords:bidding strategy  wheeling cost  game of complete information  Nash equilibrium
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