快递业“双随机、一公开”风险分级监管策略研究

针对快递企业风险水平参差不齐、监管工作平均用力的问题,围绕“双随机、一公开”监管方式,构建监管部门和快递企业的博弈模型,求解纳什均衡,对企业的风险分级特征以及分级监管策略进行分析。结果表明：自身风险水平和未来风险偏好是快递企业重要的风险分级特征,前者表现为违规生产程度,后者表现为贴现因子大小;企业贴现因子高于某一阈值时,才可控制企业的违规行为,且贴现因子与抽查频次成正相关,该阈值与检查覆盖度、行政处罚力度、“一公开”力度成负相关;在纳什均衡下,高风险企业的安全生产概率与抽查比例呈正相关,与检查覆盖度呈负相关;而低风险企业正好相反。最后,提出了针对快递企业风险分级监管的策略建议。

Research on Risk Grading Supervision Strategy of Random Inspections in Express Industry

In view of the uneven risk level and the average effort of supervision of express enterprises, focusing on the ''Double Random, One Disclosure'' supervision mode, this paper builds a game model between the supervision department and express enterprises, solves the Nash equilibrium, and analyzes the risk classification characteristics and hierarchical supervision strategies of enterprises. The results show that self risk level and future risk preference are the important risk classification characteristics of express delivery enterprises. The former shows the degree of illegal production, and the latter shows the size of discount factor; When the discount factor of an enterprise is higher than a certain threshold, the violation of the enterprise can be controlled, and the discount factor is positively correlated with the frequency of spot check, and the threshold is negatively correlated with the inspection coverage, the intensity of administrative punishment, and the intensity of "one publicity"; Under the Nash equilibrium, the safety production probability of high-risk enterprises is positively correlated with the proportion of spot check, and negatively correlated with the inspection coverage; Low risk enterprises are just the opposite. Finally, it puts forward some strategic suggestions for the risk classification supervision of express enterprises.