| 公司经理激励机制数学模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 赵大友.公司经理激励机制数学模型研究[J].三峡大学学报(自然科学版),2002,24(6):557-558,561. |
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| 作者姓名： | 赵大友 |
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| 作者单位： | 三峡大学,经济与管理学院,湖北,宜昌,443002 |
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| 摘 要： | 如何选聘公司经理本质上是公司董事会与公司经理之间的一个博弈问题。在Wilson,Spence和Zeckhauser以及Ross共同提出的博弈模型的基础上，根据公司经理对风险的喜好程度及其主观效用函数的不同，建立了相应的数学模型，即风险中性者模型、风险厌恶型模型和风险喜好型模型，并对模型参数的选取作了说明。
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| 关 键 词： | 公司经理 博弈 数学模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-7081(2002)06-0557-02 |
Research of Mathematical Model with Excitation Mechanism for Selection of Comparny Mangegr |
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| Zhao Dayou.Research of Mathematical Model with Excitation Mechanism for Selection of Comparny Mangegr[J].Journal of China Three Gorges University(Natural Sciences),2002,24(6):557-558,561. |
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| Authors: | Zhao Dayou |
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| Abstract: | The company manager is the site agent fully authorised by his headquarters,the selection of whom is a game between him and his company.Based on the works,game models done by Wilson,Spence,Zeckhauser & Ross,three models have been formulated in this paper in compliance with the different attitude towards the risk by the company manager Finally, the selection of model parameters have been discussed. |
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| Keywords: | company manager game mathematical model |
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