考虑过度自信的薪酬合同实验分析

用实验分析的方法探索不同风险态度时,股东对过度自信CEO的最优薪酬合同设计问题.通过建立股东和过度自信CEO的委托代理关系模型,并构造具体的数值实例解出最优薪酬合同后,在实验室的环境下控制CEO的风险态度及过度自信程度,检验理论模型中的最优解是否实现,从而为股东设计CEO的薪酬合同提供更加有效的参考和借鉴.实验结果表明,通过学习效应,股东和CEO的选择都向最优行动收敛,而且都显著水平地选择了理论预测的最优行动.最优的薪酬合同设计是,当CEO风险厌恶时,对低过度自信和高过度自信的CEO提供的薪酬分享系数较低,而中过度自信CEO的薪酬分享系数较高;当CEO风险中性时,对低过度自信和中过度自信的CEO提供的薪酬分享系数较高,而高过度自信CEO的薪酬分享系数较低.

An Experimental Analysis on the Compensation Contract under Consideration of Overconfidence

This paper explored how the shareholder should design the optimal compensation contract for overconfident CEO with different risk attitude.It sets up a principle-agent model between the shareholder and CEO,and constructs a numerical example to make a solution.Then it tests the theoretical optimal solution with controlling CEO's risk attitude and confidence level in the experiment lab.Accordingly it will provide more effective suggestions for shareholder. By the learning effect,both the shareholder and CEO's choices are convergent to the optimal action,which the participants choose with the remarkable level.As a result,when CEO is risk averse,the shareholder had better provide relatively low compensation sharing coefficient for low and high overconfident CEO and high coefficient for moderate one,and when CEO is risk neutral,the shareholder had better provide relatively high compensation sharing coefficient for low and moderate overconfident CEO and low coefficient for high one.