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完善股票期权激励机制的对策
引用本文:葛培波,高天云.完善股票期权激励机制的对策[J].潍坊学院学报,2002,2(3):49-51.
作者姓名:葛培波  高天云
作者单位:山东经济学院,山东,济南,250014
摘    要:股票期权是现代企业中剩余索取权的一种制度安排,它有助于抑制经营者的短期化行为,对经营者产生长期激励效应。在中国,ESO尚处于发展的初期,应通过规范证券市场、健全企业内部治理机制、建立科学的经营者业绩考核制度等途径,发展和完善ESO制度,充分发挥ESO激励机制的作用。

关 键 词:ESO  经营者  股票期权激励  中国  短期化行为  剩余索取权  现代企业  途径  科学  健全
文章编号:1671-4288(2002)03-0049-03
修稿时间:2001年12月20

Countermeasures om Improving Incentives of Executive Stock Option
GE Pei-bo,GAO Tian-yun.Countermeasures om Improving Incentives of Executive Stock Option[J].Journal of Weifang University,2002,2(3):49-51.
Authors:GE Pei-bo  GAO Tian-yun
Abstract:Executive stock option that is a system on residual claims is beneficial to restrain manager s short-term behavior and to have long-term incentive effect to managers in contemporary companies. In China,ESO is not yet perfect in its initial stage. In order to give full play to the effect of executive stock option, the system of ESO should be improved by regulating the stock market,strengthening internal administering mechanism of companies and setting up scientific system of managers'performance appraisal.
Keywords:executive stock option  incentive  countermeasure
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