| 地方政府与企业环保行为博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 陶敏,叶柏青.地方政府与企业环保行为博弈分析[J].科学技术与工程,2006,6(7):848-850. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陶敏 叶柏青 |
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| 作者单位： | 辽宁工程技术大学工商管理学院,葫芦岛,125105 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用静态博弈分析法分析了地方政府与企业环保行为的关系.基于目前我国环保监督工作主要依靠政府的事实,首先建立了一个地方政府检查与不检查、企业治污与不治污的模型.然后根据对均衡解的图形分析得出可以促使企业实施环保行为的有效方法,特别由此提出政府对环保部门进行监督的重要性.
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| 关 键 词： | 地方政府 环保 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-1815（2006）07-0848-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-12-12 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年12月12 |
Game Analysis about Environment Protection Behavior among Local Government and Enterprise |
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| TAO Min,YE Baiqing.Game Analysis about Environment Protection Behavior among Local Government and Enterprise[J].Science Technology and Engineering,2006,6(7):848-850. |
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| Authors: | TAO Min YE Baiqing |
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| Abstract: | The relation between local government and enterprise about environment protection is analyzed by the method of Game Analysis. A two person game model between the local government and enterprise is builded up. The action profile includes local government inspecting or not, enterprise harnessing pollution or not. Then through analyzing the graphs, some effective solutions to make the enterprise harness pollution are found out. Especially, the conclusion is that it is necessary for local government to supervise. |
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| Keywords: | local government environment protection game analysis |
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