首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

风险规避下的航空货运期权定价Stackelberg博弈模型
引用本文:雷丽彩,周晶.风险规避下的航空货运期权定价Stackelberg博弈模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2010,30(2):265-271.
作者姓名:雷丽彩  周晶
作者单位:南京大学,工程管理学院,南京,210093
摘    要:构建了一个考虑风险规避货运代理商的期权定价两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,分析航空公司的最优定价决策以及货运代理商的最优期权定购量和购买量.分析结果表明:风险规避货运代理商的航空货运运用期权契约可以有效规避成本增加和现货市场运价上涨的风险,提高双方的收益,实现社会的帕累托最优.

关 键 词:期权契约  收益管理  航空货运  实物期权  

Stackelberg game model of capacity options for air cargo under risk aversion
LEI Li-cai,ZHOU Jing.Stackelberg game model of capacity options for air cargo under risk aversion[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2010,30(2):265-271.
Authors:LEI Li-cai  ZHOU Jing
Institution:LEI Li-cai,ZHOU Jing (School of Management & Engineering,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China)
Abstract:The two stage Stackelberg model is established based on the assumption that freight forwarders are risk aversion.Then the article analyzes the optimal pricing of the airfreight carrier and the optimal option order quantity and option purchase quantity of the intermediary.The analysis shows that air cargo industry under risk aversion applying option contracts can effectively avoid the risk of cost increasing and spot price rising and can increase revenue of the whole system and further achieve the Pareto opt...
Keywords:option contract  revenue management  air cargo  real option
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《系统工程理论与实践》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《系统工程理论与实践》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号