| 移动通信业务代理最优激励问题的研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 顾荣明. 移动通信业务代理最优激励问题的研究[J]. 南京邮电大学学报(自然科学版), 2005, 25(1): 76-79 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 顾荣明 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 安徽移动通信有限责任公司,市场经营部,安徽,合肥,230001 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 移动通信业务市场上的两大巨头:中国移动通信集团公司和中国联合通信有限公司,由于缺少足够的营业网点,都依赖社会代理商为自己发展业务,特别是发展新的客户。因此,如何激励社会代理商发展自己的业务使自己的收益最大化,是两大运营商需要思考的问题。文中应用信息经济学委托 代理理论分析了移动通信业务两类代理最优激励合同的问题:代理放号和区域独家全面代理,得出了帕累托最优解。
|
| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 双寡头垄断 区域独家全面代理 帕累托最优 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-1972(2005)01-0076-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-03-15 |
A Study of Optimal Incentives of Principal-Agent in Mobile Telecom Market |
| |
| GU Rong-ming Marketing Department,Anhui Mobile Communication Co.Ltd,Hefei ,China. A Study of Optimal Incentives of Principal-Agent in Mobile Telecom Market[J]. JJournal of Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, 2005, 25(1): 76-79 |
| |
| Authors: | GU Rong-ming Marketing Department Anhui Mobile Communication Co.Ltd Hefei China |
| |
| Affiliation: | GU Rong-ming Marketing Department,Anhui Mobile Communication Co.Ltd,Hefei 230001,China |
| |
| Abstract: | China Mobile and China Unicom are two tycoons in mobile telecom market in China. They are lack of sales-offices, so they depend on agents for developing their business,including new customers,Therefore,it is a question for them that how to instimulate the agents to develop their business and maximize their benefits.This paper applies agent theory of information econoomics to analyze two optimal modules in mobile telecom market, one is that agents develop clients of mobile telecom for telecom enterprises, another is that China Post does all business of a region for China Unicom, and work out the Pareto Optimal solution. |
| |
| Keywords: | Principal-Agent Double-Oligopoly One agent doing all business of a region Pareto optimal |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
